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Using data collected from 206 participants, this country-specific study examines the
relationship between media consumption and Kenya’s political culture. Political scientists and
communicators contend that political culture encompasses several aspects. In this study, only
four aspects of a country’s political orientations (culture) and its relationship with the media are
examined (a) Political participation, (b) political trust, (c) patriotism, and (d) inter-ethnic
attitudes. Drawing on past research, the study establishes a link between media use and political
attitudes and behaviors of the Kenyan people, operationalized in the study as the political culture.
While the literature is divided on whether the media is a mobilizing force that influences
people’s political attitudes and behaviors positively or negatively, this study shows that online
media consumption is negatively correlated with political interest and participation, and TV
viewing is also negatively correlated with political participation. Drawings have been made on
these findings as well its theoretical, methodological, and practical implications.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
“Man is by nature a political animal,” is perhaps Aristotle’s best-known saying. It is not
just a cliché in the English language, given the frequency with which it is quoted, but, instead, its
usage suggests that its meaning is thought to be transparently clear. It portrays how the
importance of values, beliefs, and social norms in a political system have preoccupied political
philosophers throughout history. Political scientists, students of contemporary politics,
rhetoricians, psychologists, communicators, and even anthropologists have, since the ancient
days of Plato, immersed themselves in the scholarly inquiry of politics and its impact on human
life. This study will add to that body of knowledge in this field.
Aristotle’s statement demonstrates the fact that humans cannot unyoke themselves
entirely from politics. It is probably true that, for most people, politics is a peripheral aspect of
their life. Certain technical aspects of politics may not command the attention of the public. In
fact, no zealous proponent of good citizenship would and should argue that political engagement
and interest ought to be pursued at the expense of all other obligations. However, despite a lack
of political interest, members of the public subscribe to shared opinions, views, beliefs, and
values on how political leaders should run the affairs that affect them as well as how they should
conduct themselves. This is what I would refer to as a people’s collective political-cultural
orientations or simply, political culture. But to get a deeper appreciation of these politico-cultural
orientations, there is need to examine its source, culture.
Culture is a notoriously difficult term to define. This is mainly due to the multitudinous
definitions that have been proctored by cultural scholars and anthropologists (Baldwin, Faulkner,
& Hecht, 2006). Over 50 years ago, American anthropologists, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952),
analyzed the existing definitions and compiled a list of 150 different definitions. A writer
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laments about these definitions of the term, arguing that the term “has so many definitions and
facets that any overlap in this myriad of definitions might actually be absent” (Yengoyan, 1989,
p. 3). This slippery and ubiquitous nature perhaps led Baldwin et al. (2006) to note, “The
definition of culture is a moving target, and those who choose to define it should ground their
definitions in a fuller, multidisciplinary, and historicized accounting of the word” (p. 24). The
following definitions give meaning to this “empty shell”. According to Barnett (1988):
Culture consists of the habits and tendencies to act in certain ways, but not the action
themselves. It is the language patterns, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, and thought
patterns—not things or behaviors, but forms of things that people have in mind, in their
models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them. (p. 102)
However, in this study, culture is operationalized following Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s (1952)
summarized definition-which is broader as it goes beyond the patterns of thought advanced by
Barnett to include action and behavior:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups,
including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional
(i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture
systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as
conditional elements of future action. (p. 181)
Clearly, the definitions above converge on the idea that culture consists of something that
is shared and/or learned by a group of people even though the content of its definitions vary.
These shared convictions, values, beliefs, and skills have a significant impact on politics,
especially on democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1988). Putnam (2000) also argues that politics
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(e.g., political participation) cannot be examined in isolation of the culture of the masses.
Moreover, Putnam posits that the success or failure of democratic institutions reflects the degree
to which a culture of trust and participation is present, the two key variables in this study.
Culture influences the relationship between polity and society, hence the term political culture.
Political culture, according to Inglehart (1988), varies from one society to another and is
passed on from one generation to the next through a process called socialization. One of the
prominent socializing agents is the mass media which are rich sources of information about the
politics, current affairs, and the government. But the seminal question here is: Does the media
consumption have any relationship with people’s political attitudes and behaviors (political
culture)?
Past Research on Media Use and Political Attitudes and Behaviors
A substantial body of research has documented the relationship and the effect of the mass
media on the formation, change, and/or stabilization of political opinions and attitudes. For
instance, McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) agenda-setting inspired literature that has provided
evidence that the mass media influence the judgment of important issues by the public following
its prominence in the media Shah, Shmeirbach, Hawkins, Espino, and Donovan (2002) suggest
that increased online media use have a negative relationship with political interest and
participation, while Kenski and Stroud (2006) offer opposing view by arguing that the use of the
Internet for informational purposes have a positive relationship with political efficacy,
knowledge, interest, and participation Voter turnout studies in the United States suggest that
increased exposure to television significantly reduces political participation (Putnam, 2000)
while exposure to hard news in the print media is associated with higher turnout and other forms
of participation as well (McCleod & McDonald, 1985). These landmark studies have
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demonstrated empirically how the news comes to shape public understanding of politics and its
relationship with citizen’s political knowledge, and by extension, political interest, patriotism,
trust, participation, and racial and/or ethnic attitudes. However, many of these studies have been
conducted in the United States and other “western”’ countries.
Despite the prevalence of research on the relationship between and the impact of the
news media on political attitudes and behaviors, little attention has been given to such influences
in the continent of Africa. Given this scholarly ‘blackout’ and the significance of the news media
on African politics, more empirical investigations are thus warranted in this area.
The Current Study
Ever since Almond and Verba (1963) conducted and published their five-nation study,
The Civic Culture, scholars have sought to extend and/or replicate the study in other jurisdictions
and countries. Despite the tremendous success in these replica studies, very little has been
documented about Africa and, more specifically, Kenya. Anglo-American studies continue to
dominate the scholarship on politics, political culture, and political communication. (Sanders,
2009). Asian research is also becoming well-established while studies about Africa, its culture,
its people, its politics, and other facets remain understudied. Thus, Nwosu (2005) argues that
there is a need to study and understand how Africans draw from their cultural patterns in
conducting their affairs, in this case, in their political affairs.
Africa is the home to over one billion people, over 1500 different languages, and about
3000 ethnic groups spread over 54 countries (Nwosu, 2005). While this vast continent provides
“a treasure trove of opportunity for scholarly inquiry…not much has been done” (Nwosu, 2005,
p. 2). This study is an attempt to fill this void by providing a better understanding of one of the
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African countries, Kenya. Specifically, the relationship between media use and political attitudes
and behaviors in Kenya will be examined.
Kenya is an East-African country with a population of approximately 45 million people,
and 43 native ethnic groups as well as Europeans, Asians, and Arabs. It is the region’s economic
hub (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Historically, the remains of human fossils were
found here leading many to believe that it is the birthplace of humankind. The country named
after Mount Kenya, which is a significant landmark and the second highest mountain peak in
Africa, has been described as a lively cultural storehouse with gracious people (Kanyinga, 2014).
People greet visitors with ‘jambo?’ (greetings!) or ‘habari gani?’ (what’s the news?). Kenyan
athletes have thrilled the world in long-distance races by winning world major marathons and
track events. It is a country well known for its exotic Maasai community with conservative
cultures and, particularly, its unique traditional regalia. Kenya is a kaleidoscope of culture and
land; when it is mentioned, people think about its wildlife. However, the pride of most Kenyans
lies in their culture, their families, sports (athletics), and in their land (country), and, only after
that, in their wildlife. Beyond this rich and complex description is the people’s orientations
toward politics. The Swahili word ‘harambee’ (meaning pull together) fittingly describes this
diverse and unique country, especially its style of politics characterized by deep ethnic
cleavages. This is an aspect of the Kenyan way of life that will be explored in this study.
Kenya’s political culture is well documented in literature (Mukhongo, 2009: Shilaho,
2018). However, the relationship between the prevailing political attitudes and behaviors
(political culture) and self-reported media use habits in Kenya remains understudied. As such,
the purpose of this study is to investigate, explain, and thus, address a major limitation in
understanding Kenya’s political culture, namely the relationship and the perceived influence of
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the Kenyan media on Kenya’s political culture. This study examines the relationship between
media consumption and the various variables that form a nation’s political culture within the
framework of media effects theories.
Previous conceptualizations of political culture include several aspects (Almond &
Verba, 1963), but in this study concentrates on four major dimensions of society’s political
culture; (i) political interest and participation, (ii) political trust, (iii) patriotism, and (iv) interethnic attitudes in Kenya.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter two conceptualizes political
culture and explores extensively political cultures across the world with a review of literature.
The chapter also addresses the prevalent political cultures in Africa as it narrows down to the
political culture in Kenya. Additionally, there is also a discussion on the political communication
effects regarding political interest, patriotism, participation, trust, and ethnicity. Finally,
integrated in the chapter are research questions guiding this study. Chapter three outlines the
methods to be used in the study and how each variable will be measured. Chapter four will
present the findings after the analysis of the collected data and chapter five will present a
thorough discussion and summary as it also identifies the limitations of the research as well
suggestions for further research.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of the political culture, the influence of the mass
media on politics, and the context-Kenya-where the study will be based. The next chapter will
provide a deeper understanding of political cultures across the world, in Africa, and finally, in
Kenya. The impact of the news media on political attitudes will also be documented, thus setting
a bedrock for the research questions that will guide this study.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
A useful scholarly inquiry on political culture and its perceived relationship with the
media, requires an examination of previous research. This chapter provides a summary of the
extensive gains made in scholarly knowledge in conceptualizing political culture and the media’s
role in entrenching, changing, reflecting, or influencing an individual’s and or society’s political
culture. First, the chapter suggests a conceptual understanding of political culture. Second, this
section will review studies on political cultures across the world, in Africa, and lastly, in Kenya.
Then, it will provide a coverage of media effects/relationships with political attitudes, values,
beliefs as well as behavioral implications. In this way, previous studies will provide a basis upon
which the researcher will pose research questions to guide the study.
Conceptualizing Political Culture
Defining Political Culture
An examination of previous literature suggests that descriptions of political culture range
from the highly elaborate and declamatory definition by Almond and Verba (1963) that political
culture refers to “the political orientations—the attitudes toward the political system and its
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (p. 13) to the description by
Wilson (1997) that simply defines political culture as a country’s political personality. However,
Wilson further expounds that a political culture consists of well-established, deep-rooted political
traits that are a feature of a society. This definition by Wilson demonstrates the relationship
between political culture and the plain old culture, since political culture stems from the
overarching convictions shared by a people, albeit, regarding politics.
Elazar (1994) comments that political culture is also made up of what is sometimes
referred to as “habits of the heart,” which includes formal rules as well as customs and traditions
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that are passed on from one generation to the next. For example, people agree to abide by a set of
formal regulations, such as the constitution and other statutory laws. People also live by the
unwritten rules such as the norm in the United States to accept election results without
necessarily resorting to violence. It is what Elazar (1994) terms as political culture that sets the
boundaries of acceptable political behavior in a society. Additionally, the shared political
customs and traditions are what help people to create and share an understanding of why and
how certain political processes and activities occur in their country, thus building their
communities through shared communication. De Silva, Clark, &, Vieira (2015) defines political
culture as a system of political symbols, and this system nests within a more inclusive system
that we might term political communication.
Swedlow (2011) offers a unique perspective toward understanding political culture. The
scholar argues that if politics poses the question of “who gets what, when, where, and how,”
then, Swedlow says, political culture supplies a big part of the answer. “If politics is the art of the
possible, then political culture helps define the limits of that art, for culture defines what is
generally permissible in a given society” (p. 2). According to Swedlow, political culture (defined
as the shared values and beliefs of a group regarding political relationships and public policy)
answers the question of how human beings are going to live together. In addition, Swedlow
posits that political culture answers the question of who decides, who has authority, and who has
power in a group, organization, institution, or other social unit in society.
Types of Political Culture
Citizens hold different attitudes toward political objects and processes, which
consequently puts them in different categories of political ‘subcultures’ (Almond & Verba,
1963). These classifications, according to Almond and Verba, include;
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Participant culture. In this first category, individuals have positive orientations toward a
political system and are, therefore, active players within the system. Additionally, the citizens
pay close attention to politics and regard popular participation as desirable and useful.
Subject culture. This second category is characterized by passivity of citizens and
recognition of limited ability to influence the government. It includes individuals who have
positive orientations toward the political system but play passive roles in the system.
Parochial culture. This third category includes individuals who are indifferent toward
the political system and tend to be politically passive. A parochial political culture is marked by
the presence of a sense of citizenship, with people identifying more with their locality than their
nation (Wilson, 1997). According to Almond and Verba (1963), these political subcultures blend
to create the political culture of a society.
Given the paucity of studies that explore Kenyan political culture as well as its
relationship with media use by the Kenyan people, a gap that I hope to help fill with this study,
an exploration of political cultures across the globe is thus warranted. In doing so, I hope to
highlight the unique political orientations that are characteristic of different countries worldwide
and that are significant in understanding the shared political attitudes and behaviors
(operationalized as political culture) of the Kenyan people.
Political Cultures Across the Globe
In political-cultural studies, scholars focus on the political attitudes, values, beliefs, and
ideologies that are associated with and that explain the political behaviors of individuals or
groups of individuals of a nation. Almond and Verba (1963) are credited with conducting a
ground-breaking study on political cultures across five democracies namely, the United States,
Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. They selected the United States and Britain because the
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two countries represent relatively successful experiments in democratic political systems. The
choice of Germany was due its historical blend of fascism and, later, democracy. Italy and
Mexico were also included because, during the time of the study, they were “examples of less
well-developed societies with transitional political systems” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 39). As
will be demonstrated below, this study provided the necessary spark that led political scientists
and other students of contemporary politics into further research beyond Almond and Verba’s
initial five “mother” countries.
American Political Culture
A colossal body of research studies is available on the distinct and conventional style of
politics in America, at least until recently, when the country witnessed populist political styles
espoused by the front runner and the eventual winner of the presidential elections, Donald
Trump. This wave of populism described by Garrido (2017) as a manner of acting and speaking
that serves to cultivate the popular identification, consists of “tactics such as anti-elite rhetoric
and the flouting of social conventions” (Garrido, 2017, p. 2). President Donald Trump played
this ace card successfully to secure the presidency. That notwithstanding, numerous scholars
have examined the effects of the media on the American public, particularly, on the public’s
political attitudes which subsequently determines their political behaviors. But first, a closer look
at the elements of the American political culture, that Wilson (1997) posit are both abstract and
concrete.
Beliefs. America is built on the principles of equality and liberty (McClosky & Zaller,
1987). There is a widely held believe in America that individuals should be free to do as they
will, that they have the right to be free from restraint as long as one’s rights do not infringe on
those of the other people. The founding fathers of American democracy, during their Declaration
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of Independence, endorsed the principles of equality and liberty, rights and freedoms that are
now enshrined in the constitution (Bennett, 1980). However, McClosky and Zaller (1987) argue
that the concept of equality should be understood in terms of “equality of opportunity” not
absolute equality. These two key principles that have been incorporated into the political culture
of the United States in the form of egalitarianism and individualism.
Egalitarianism. Is the doctrine of equality of humans and its emphasis of the absence of
superiority of a set of humans over others (Hunter & Bowman, 1996). This central American
belief is found in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, which states that all men are
created equal and that people are endowed with the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness (Bennet, 1980). This is demonstrated by the act of Americans treating each
other as equals, whatever their education, occupation or social class. However, scholars are quick
to point out that that this form of equality implied equality of opportunity rather than equality of
condition or economic equality (Schlozman, Verba & Brady, 1999). They also assert that even
though the concept of equality is hardly achieved due to discrimination based on race and sex,
the belief is still highly entrenched.
Individualism. Gudynkust and Ting-Toomey (1988) posit that, “Basically, individualism
refers to the broad value tendencies of a culture to emphasize the importance of individual
identity over group identity, individual rights over group rights, and individual needs over group
needs” (p. 376). There is a devotion in America to individualism (Hunter & Bowman, 1996). The
scholars argue that it is highly valued and has permeated almost every facet of life including
politics, religion, and education. Consistent with the constitution’s preoccupation with liberty,
individualism is also what drives American parents to teach their children that individuals can
succeed through hard work, perseverance, and self-reliance. These core American beliefs
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permeates every aspect of the public’s lives and are consequently reflected in the political
spheres of the American public and predictably, shape the nation’s political climate and
practices.
American values. Wilson (1997) notes that beliefs provide the foundation for values
which refers to a society’s shared convictions of what is just and good. According to Hunter and
Bowman (1996), the core American values are vested in in the American creed. These values
include but are not limited to the following: (i) Democracy: If democracy is defined in terms of
a simple devotion to ruling with consent of the governed, then there is no doubt that Americans
cherish it. The American creed states that the United States government is a government by the
people, for the people, whose just powers are derived from the governed (Schlozman, Verba &
Brady, 1999). Americans value a majority rule, a representative government, and the rights of an
individual (Hunter & Bowman, 1996; Wilson, 1997). Most Americans believe that democracy is
the best of government and will therefore, lend support to initiatives aimed at expanding and
protecting democracy (Pew Research Center, 2009). (ii) American exceptionalism: Americans
strongly believe that the United States is the best and the strongest nation on earth (Sullivan,
Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). It is the view that America has earned its place in the world through
exceptional development and that its vast frontiers offers boundless and equal opportunities for
all to succeed with sheer hard work and perseverance. According to Hunter and Bowman (1996),
Americans feel that the United States serves as an example to other countries. (iii) Nationalism
and patriotism: When Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the political culture in the United
States almost 50 years ago, they discovered that Americans “have a high degree of pride in their
political system” (p. 440). American’s love for their country is summed up by the maxim that
says that virtuous citizens display a sense of devotion to their country and the fundamental
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values that it upholds. The Pew Research Center (2009) posits that despite the negative attitudes
toward the government and the distrust held toward the political elite, most Americans are proud
of their country and their past and, yet do not emphasize their past but focus on their future. This
is seen in the way Americans support their military, embrace the American flag, and sing the
country’s national anthem.
These cultural artefacts and symbols (such as the spirit of individualism, egalitarianism,
and exceptionalism) have transcended the plain old cultural scope to reflect the nation’s political
climate. Basically, these are core values that predictably shape America’s political climate and
practices.
Political participation and civic engagement. Almond and Verba (1963) described the
American public over 50 years ago as being frequently exposed to politics, engaging in political
discussion, being involved in political affairs, having a sense of obligation to take active part in
the community, and having a sense of competence to influence the government. However, as
Putnam (2000) found five decades later, there was a decline in American participation in
political activities ranging from signing petitions, attending rallies to voter turn-out. Putnam
presented a stereotypical view of a new generation young Americans as ‘couch potatoes.’
Putnam laments that America is reminded each year that fewer voters show up at the polls than
in most other democracies. Attempts to explain this decline have largely centered on young
people, though participations have been dropping for all age groups, Putnam posits that youth
political engagement has been the most precipitous because it is the most affected segment of the
population. Although mitigated somewhat by the modest upward movement of voter turnout
during the 2004 and 2008 elections (Cebula, Payne, & Saltz, 2017), concern regarding low (and
declining) voter turnout in the U.S. nevertheless is expressed frequently in the media and
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elsewhere. In a cross-cultural analysis between the Turkey and the United States on
argumentativeness and political participation, Croucher et.al (2013) found that in 2008, the voter
turnout in the United States was 56.9% while Turkey had a voter turnout of 84%.
To get a general outlook of the variations and or similarities in political cultures across
the globe, there is also need to document literature on the political attitudes and behaviors of
other countries, with uniquely different political systems from that of the United States.
Political Culture in Latin America
Democracy in Latin America. “The region has many problems,” noted The Economist
in a 2002 cover story, “but democracy, as such, is not one of them.” This is a comment that may
raise eye brows of many North Americans because of the entrenched perception that democracy
cannot thrive in South America. However, political scientists and communicators echo that
indeed, democracy has weathered the storms of militarism and warlordism to be where it is now.
The Economist published that warlordism, juntas, and coups are no longer a problem since most
Latin American countries have embraced democratic ideals. In fact, Salinas and Booth (2009;
2011) found that in 18 Latin American countries, most people have a strong liking and support
for democratic ideals. There is generally a high consensus and drive toward strengthening a
participatory democratic political culture with an entrenched dislike for authoritarianism and
military coups (Booth and Richard, 2011). Encarnación (2003) poses the question, “What
accounts for the growth and flourishing of democratic ideals in Latin America?” (p. 4) The
answer derives seemingly, in large part, from what Koonings and Kruijt (2003) describe as a
profound transformation of political attitudes and thus, political culture. Latin Americans value
democratic governance for the political freedoms and civil rights that accompany it above the
social and economic benefits it may or may not deliver (Arce, 2003).
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Political militarism. The political culture in Latin America has not always been
characterized by a representative government, a majority rule, and an active citizenry. Koonings
and Kruijt (2003) argue that Latin American countries (such as Chile and Venezuela) have not
always been models of democratic practice. The region, since independence, was the land of
revolutions, military seizures of power, and brutal dictatorships. In fact, Arce (2003), extends
this point further and states that “twentieth century Latin America has been the continent of
political soldiers and military politicians” (p. 1). The military have intervened several times to
act as a stabilizing force during political chaos, as a disinterested arbiter, to protect the power of
the constitution, and as guardians of national development. In this intervening activity, generals
became politicians in military uniforms.
Corruption and political distrust. Corruption is major problem in some parts of the
Americas. According to a report compiled by the World Bank, corruption trails crime and the
economy in terms of the issues about which South Americans are most concerned. While the
levels of corruption vary from one country to another, bribery in several Latin American
countries is an everyday occurrence (Ugur, 2014). Studies show that corruption has enormous
negative effects such as slowing down economic growth), skewing wealth distribution, and
lowering the efficiency and effectiveness of public services (since resources meant for public
programs are diverted for personal gain (Ugur, 2014). Corruption has pernicious political,
economic, and social effects. Additionally, corruption discourages citizens from political
engagement. When citizens witness rampant corruption by public officials while no action is
being taken against them, apathy tends to creep in.
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Political participation. A 2014 study conducted in the Americas by the US state
department found that citizens of Chile, Panama, and Argentina participate passively in
municipal meetings, political rallies, and other forms of local-level participation. In the report by
Zechmeister (2014), citizens attribute their passive participation to government inefficiency,
massive corruption, and stagnant economies. Despite the challenges faced in the Latin American
countries, the levels of trust in the government is uncharacteristically high. For example,
Zechmeister reports that trust in the government is very high in Nicaragua and Chile.
Political Culture in Asia
A study of cross-national political cultures in Asia might begin with a study of the
political cultures of two neighboring countries that seem to closely mirror each other, China and
Singapore. China has been described as a downstream manufacturing powerhouse and a
revolutionary force in the global space (Chang, 2015). Singapore, once described as a colonial
backwater (Rae, 2001) and the Disneyland with the death penalty (Kluver, 2004), has a
fascinating story of enormous economic development into one of the richest and most developed
Asian nations after just handful years of independence.
Political trust. According to Li (2004), people in mainland China generally have more
trust in the central government and less trust in local government. Li argues that this is because
of strict media surveillance against negative information about the central government as
compared to the local government. The situation in Hong Kong is different because the media
still play the watchdog role of holding the government in check, thus eroding the public trust in
government through negative reports. Li also notes that distrust is particularly prominent among
Hong Kong youth who have unrestricted access to Internet and social media, where they can get
information and thus criticize the government, which may lead to reduced political participation.

16

Political participation. Political participation in Mainland China is different from that of
well-established democracies (Chan, 1994). Citizens have limited channels to participate in
politics. Li (2004) posits that central officials are not elected through open, free, fair general
elections. Even when elections are held at the local level, the avenues for political participation
are limited because the nomination and subsequent elections of elections are manipulated by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In addition, traditional political participation through voting,
petitioning, and demonstration form a part of the participation by the Chinese. Similarly, in
Singapore, the elections in this country, referred to by economists as an “Asian tiger,” is
characterized by heavy manipulation (Mutalib, 2000). In addition, the electorate are described by
Chia (2016) as passive and parochial, more concerned with bread-and-butter issues than with
human rights, social justice, and the notion of democracy. According to Chia, this conservative
nature of Singaporeans has enabled the ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), to hold on
to power since Singapore split from Malaysia in August 1965. Despite winning economic
accolades for its economic policies, its political culture has been described as immature (Chia,
2016).
Popular support. Despite its autocratic nature, and perhaps surprisingly, the
authoritarian regime in China enjoys one of the highest levels of popular support in Asia, higher
than that enjoyed by many democratic regimes in the region (Domestic politics, 2010). At the
same time, there are fears that Singapore is slipping away from a ‘guided democracy’ to a ‘soft
authoritarianism’ (Welsh, 2015). This notwithstanding, the government enjoys unprecedented
public support. Indeed, according to a 2010 survey by US-based PR firm Edelman, trust in
Singapore’s government stood at 84%, far ahead of the global average of 49%, thus ranking the
country first out of the 22 surveyed (Domestic politics, 2010).
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Patriotism and national pride. Right after independence, the government of Singapore
revamped its education syllabus in the hope of inculcating the values of patriotism, loyalty, and
civic consciousness in the context of a multiracial society (Chew, 1988). The appreciation of this
early nature of citizenship education is important in understanding the contemporary political
culture in Singapore (Chia, 2016). The civics syllabus for example was designed to “reflect the
concerns of the authorities toward developing a sense of national identity in children” (Sim &
Print 2009, p. 706). The emphasis was placed on character development, good habits, moral
development, and citizenship responsibilities with an objective of stimulating patriotic feelings
and making children staunch citizens (Ong, 1979). In short, Singapore, through the school
syllabus, to foster in Singaporean pupils a sense of civic and social responsibility as well as “a
love for its country and its people” (Ong, 1979, p. 3). According to Chia (2016), the 2015
election result in Singapore in which the ruling party PAP maintained its dominance should not
be surprising, the election affirmed the success of the citizenship education relentlessly taught in
schools.
Media space. The People’s Republic of China has arguably one of the most restrictive
media systems in the world (Chan, 1994). The government notoriously controls all media outlets
to maintain its monopoly on power and information. Chan also asserts that knowledge is the
main catalyst of political change, and, for fear of this, the Chinese government has been
successful in stifling independent reporting and critical journalism, which can lead to political
mobilization and ultimately political change. The Singaporean government on the other hand has
also developed a firm control over online media and narrowed the scope of political debate in
mainstream media (Domestic politics, 2010).
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Political cultures vary across the globe, as demonstrated above. The United States, with
rich literature on political culture, exemplifies a democratic political system based in the
country’s belief in the rule of law, political tolerance, liberty, high national pride, high political
cynicism, and decreasing political participation. Latin America is characterized by maturing
democracies to the “surprise” of many. The South American countries have shaken off the tag of
dictatorships as a result of changing political attitudes that have led to a transformation of
political cultures. The Asian countries reviewed, China and Singapore, portray authoritarian
political systems characterized by a one-party system and centralized power. Moreover, the two
economic giants stifle media freedom, restrict academic discourse on human rights and
democracy, and do not tolerate critics. Despite the prevailing political atmosphere, which may
seem bleak and retrogressive, the two regimes enjoy massive popular support for their economic
policies. Since this study focuses on a country specific political culture, a summary of the
political culture of the African continent is important.
As demonstrated above, Asian political cultures can be somewhat similar regionally but
with unique national differences. Similarly, the Americas have certain closely related political
characteristics but different orientations by country. The same trend is thus expected in the vast
African continent. Since this study focuses on a country specific political culture, a more focused
summary of the African continent is important as it narrows down to the specific context of the
study, Kenya.
African Political Culture
This study investigates the relationships between media consumption and political culture
(i.e., political-orientations, attitudes, and traditions) of the Kenyan people. Therefore, to better
understand the political culture of this unique African community and its possible relationship
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with the media, it is important to explore the nature of politics in the entire African continent as
established in previous studies.
According to Carlson (2015), traditional African culture consists of sub-Saharan African
values, beliefs, cultural themes, and behaviors that existed before the arrival of the Europeans.
These enduring beliefs and values inform the behaviors of the African people to date. Some of
these values and core cultural themes include the emphasis on the community rather than the
individual (collectivism, the belief in the proverb that says, “I am because we are” or Ubuntu);
hospitality and friendly disposition of Africans (friendship is not perceived as a temporary affair,
friends become part of family to the extent that long-time friends are considered cousins); strong
religious attachments; time is conceptualized in terms of connections and not schedules (the
strong belief that one must not be a slave to schedules);, a natural tendency to be patient, tolerant,
sympathetic, and accepting.
However, Moemeka (1996) cautions against the idea of a single “umbrella” culture in the
entire African continent. She posits that despite the existence of common and uniquely African
cultural threads, there exists certain unique differences and thus, unique African cultures.
Moemeka asserts that African beliefs can be obtained anywhere across Africa and have a huge
impact on the communicative behavior of Africans everywhere. I would also argue that these
African orientations permeate the political lives of the African people.
Democracy and Political Participation in Africa
Africa’s political landscape has changed dramatically in the recent past. Following the
collapse of old regimes that took over from the colonialists, African countries embarked on
transitions to multi-partism that were initially welcomed as the beginning of a continent-wide
wave of democratization (Call, 2008). This led to the rise of vibrant civil societies, multiparty
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politics, and free press. Just as in Latin America, the simplistic generalization that democracy is
foreign to Africa is misguided. Several African countries have stable democracies: Such as,
Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, and Botswana (Kanyinga, 2009) However, in certain countries such
as Congo, democracy is merely a concept (McLaughlin, 2007) With the rise of regular elections,
political elites devised strategies to hold on to power and thus pitted one ethnic group against the
other. In fact, McLaughlin found that there is a very strong correlation between ethnicity and
voting choice in several African countries. This speaks to the style of political participation of in
some countries in the continent.
Ethnicity and Elections
Call (2008) notes that perhaps the most studied phenomenon in all of African political
behavior is the tendency of voters in many parts of the continent to support political candidates
of their own ethnicities. According to Call, voters exercise these democratic rights in support of
co-ethnic politicians even in the absence of prejudice but in the hope that these politicians will
steer resources to their own ethnic group at the expense of other groups. Research has found that
ethnicity strongly predicts vote choice in Kenya and Ghana (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008) even
though voters may still report that ethnicity is not a factor in their vote choice, and, while some
consider ethnicity in the privacy of voting booth, they downplay its importance when they report
their decision-making to others (Basedau & Stroh, 2009). This is somewhat similar to Barack
Obama’s 2008 elections and the factor of race. Up until 2008, it would have been almost
impossible to gauge the tendency of Americans to vote for someone from their own ethnicity,
since until 208 there had never been a non-white candidate for president from either of the two
key political parties (Bobo & Dawson, 2009). Did Barack Obama’s success transform America’s
racial divide? Did he somehow help bring to an end centuries of racial division in the United
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States? The answer to this is largely in part seen from the support Obama received from white
Americans and most significantly from black America. “Race was a major undercurrent in the
campaign” (Bobo & Dawson, 2009, p. 2). However, “small but continued minorities of white
admitted that race was a factor in their support for Hillary Clinton, as one in ten said in South
Dakota … Obama was never able to make sustainable inroads with the white working class,
female, and white older women” (Bobo & Dawson, 2009, p.3). It is plausible to argue that
support toward co-ethnic member is a human tendency rather than solely African.
Crook (1997) found that, when given no other information about a pair of hypothetical
candidates, 80% of Ugandans and 87% of Kenyans select the candidate who shares their
ethnicity. Despite ethnicity often playing a role, its impact differs from country to country, and is
just one of a number of factors impacting political culture. For instance, ethnicity is not salient at
all in some countries such as Tanzania (Basedau & Stroh, 2009). Ethnic voting may be construed
as a manifestation of ‘tribalism,’ which is censured in some African societies, where it is
portrayed as socially unacceptable despite its rampant nature, just as racism is in the United
States (McLaughlin, 2007).
As previously argued by Moemeka (1996), every African country is unique even though
there are certain behaviors and/or orientations that are uniquely African and will be obtained
everywhere in Africa. This study investigates country-specific political orientations. Therefore, a
summary of Kenya’s political culture is also important.
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Kenya’s Political Culture
Kenya, the economic and political economic hub of East Africa (Miller & Yeager, 1994),
is a country defined by the diversity of its people and cultures. It is a country whose political
story is a grand narrative woven in high drama and intrigue. To precisely describe Kenya’s
political system is a tremendous challenge. Some scholars, like Mukhongo (2009) describe
Kenya as capitalist in nature but with a touch of African socialism.
Kenya’s Exceptionalism
Kenya may not be influential on a global scale, but its place as a beacon of democracy
and political stability shines bright. Lonsdale (1992) notes that Kenya’s unique story lies in its
economic growth, despite the lack of minerals, and its political openness and stability, a situation
similar to that of many other African and European countries. Mukhongo (2009) also comments
that Kenya’s history has not been one of war, military rule, mass murder, or state collapse. Even
though the country’s narrative may not be characterized by its influence on the world economy,
Kenya is one of the most stable democracies in Africa with its people beaming with national
pride (Oyugi, Wanyande, & Odhiambo-Mbai, 2008). Similarly, Kanyinga (2014) posits that,
unlike most African states, Kenya has avoided military rule, social instability, warlordism, mass
murder or social collapse. Additionally, religious divisions have not led to violence as in Nigeria.
Moreover, Kenya is one of the few countries in Africa that conducts elections regularly
(Mukhongo, 2009), and the losers in the general elections do not resort to war when they lose
even though there are occasional ethnic clashes as a result of disputed elections (Lonsdale,
2004). Kenya is also a force to reckon with, politically and economically, in East and Central
Africa (Amutabi, 2013).
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Political Trust
According to the World Values Survey (2010), which asks citizens around the world
about their activities, beliefs, and opinions, Kenyans have been found to be less trusting
compared to their neighbors Tanzanians. Indeed, compared to other African societies, Kenyans
trust strangers more than their countrymen. Similarly, local polls conducted in Kenya by Ipsos
Synnovate have consistently found that Kenyans lack trust in key democratic institutions. A
survey conducted in 2017 by Twaweza East Africa, a Kenyan firm, shows that Kenyan
politicians are the least trusted in the society while the media, religious leaders, and civil society
remain the most trusted.
From the fountain of constitutional amendments that led to the advent of political
pluralism in Kenya and consigned political dictatorship to the dustbin of history, ethnicity reared
its ugly head. In fact, Shilaho (2018) notes that politicians exploited political pluralism to
entrench ethnicity as the fulcrum of political power, which is the salience of ethnicity in politics,
and used it to incite co-ethnics against other communities and to canvass for political support
during electioneering. Politicians instrumentalized ethnicity as a springboard to political power.
Ethnicity in Kenyan Politics
Kenya’s politics cannot be understood without understanding Kenyan ethnicity. Before
expounding further, let me clarify my use of ethnicity. I choose ethnicity over tribalism because
of the reductive connotation that tribes and tribalism denote. It is a term that has been used only
to refer to African ethnic groups. For example, I argue that the term tribe, which is a social
construct, was used by the British imperialists to orient the Kenyan people as primordial and
primitive in their divide and rule racist colonial ideologies. I therefore choose ethnicity as a more
acceptable term that grants dignity to the Kenyan populace and the entire African people. In
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using the concept, I take note of the most popular view that African societies are characterized
by deep ethnic cleavages that are ancient and permanent. In this view, ethnicity is viewed as
irrational and primordial, which I contest is in reference to tribalism and not ethnicity. There is
nothing wrong with belonging to or identifying with an ethnic extraction, since it is a form of
identification with a group of people sharing common consciousness based on language and
culture, but there is everything wrong with tribalism as a practice. The second view and use of
ethnicity, which I strongly embrace, is that it is a social construct and a moving target.
Political activity in Kenya is centered on the construction of ethnicity, ethnic
mobilization, and polarization (Ajulu,2002). Ethnic identities are used primarily used by political
elites to mobilize citizen support and are rationally (or rather irrationally) embraced by the
people. Ethnic politics transcends other forms of political identities such as party affiliations,
issues, and discourses. Lonsdale (1992) notes that ethnicity “is not, and never was, the primordial
constant but an arena of conflict” (p. 3). It is ethnicity that forms the fulcrum of both national and
local politics in Kenya (Kanyinga, 2014). In electoral competition, ethnicity is used by political
elites to marshall political power, get a seat at the table, and access economic resources. The
elites invoke the rhetoric of access to resources for the benefit of their communities to mobilize
their kin in competitions with other ethnic groups, but at the end of the day the common people
do not gain anything.
Kenya comprises many ethnic groups, whose actual number is difficult to obtain given
the fluid nature of these identities. However, estimates from various sources, including the
census, show that the country has about 44 ethnic groups (Kanyinga, 2014). Based on census
results, the major groups are Kikuyu (18%), Luhya (14%), Kalenjin (13%), Luo (10%), and
Kamba, (9%). The ethnicization of Kenya’s politics means these ethnicities control most the
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state power from the executive, public appointments to the parliament. However, since no single
ethnic group is numerically large enough to dominate the rest, they are forced to form ethnic
coalitions to ascend to power. This has been the case since the start of self-governance in 1963
(Ajulu, 2002).
Historical perspective. Long before and even after the British imperial activities in
Kenya, Kenya’s different ethnic groups enjoyed peaceful co-existence reflected in intermarriages and trade (Klopp, 2013). Conflict, when it occurred, was a consequence of sharing
resources such as water and grazing. As the British, by bullet, occupied more land and controlled
resources, they started discriminating based on ethnicities leading to the emergence of “tribes”.
They started pitting ethnic groups against each other, while allocating more resources to the
allies (Lynch, 2007). It was as a result of administrative expedience on the part of the
colonialists. This new way of differentiating among communities, and especially the perception
that some tribes were discriminated against, triggered grievances and animosity that still exists
even today. This explains why one’s ethnicity is still a strong form of identity in Kenya today.
“What is your tribe?” Is a question that is on the tip of the tongue when Kenyans introduce each
other.
As indigenous Kenyan political parties emerged in the 1950s, the links between ethnicity
and politics could be clearly identified. The political elites took advantage of the ethnic
grievances to mobilize support from their ethnic groups (Lynch, 2008). The Kenya African
National Union (KANU) was started to defend the interests of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana,
and, Samburu whereas Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) aimed to protect the larger
Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups. When Kenya attained self-rule in 1963, KANU took over and
ruled until 2002. The change of power from KANU to National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was
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viewed as a chance for Kenyans to right their wrongs, politically. However, leading up to the
2007 general elections, Kenya was sliding back to negative ethnicity characterized by erosion of
civic nationhood. Ethnic tensions were palpable between the supporters of the leading
presidential candidates, President Mwai Kibaki and the opposition leader Raila Odinga. These
tensions led to the infamous post-election violence that rocked Kenya following the
announcement of results in January 2008. As a result, over 1000 people lost their lives and close
200,000 people were displaced from their homes.
Lonsdale (2004) postulates that since the founding of multiparty politics in 1992 in
Kenya, ethnicity has replaced political ideology and or class as a sense of political organization.
In the Kenyan case, ethnic loyalty has more influence than national identity and classes,
especially during electioneering. This explains the commonplace contention that, out of all the
four presidents Kenya has had, three come from the Kikuyu ethnic group and one is from the
Kalenjin group (Mukhongo, 2009), making the other ethnicities feel neglected. There is,
Mukhongo argues, a perception that these two ethnic groups during their “tenure” have enjoyed
immense political and economic privileges. This perception is used by politicians to incite other
ethnicities against these two and hence bring them together to topple the dominance.
Even though ethnic politics continue to entrench marginalization, disenfranchisement,
corruption, and conflict, as experienced in 2008, Kenyans continue to propagate negative
ethnicity. The Daily Nation (2017) notes, “Historically speaking, political parties have never
really divorced themselves from ethnic affiliations.”
The seminal question in this study, therefore, is what is the relationship between the
consumption of the Kenyan media with the political culture exhibited by the Kenyan people?
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Providing a substantial answer to this question requires an exploration of the media’s effects on
and relationship with politics.
Media in Kenya and its Evolving Relationship with Politics
The Kenyan mass media have grown exponentially from the 19th century archaic systems
based solely on oral communication to the 21st century, sophisticated TV networks, radio
stations, print media, and digital media. Kenya has made great strides in liberalizing its mass
media sector in tandem with prevailing spirit of pluralistic politics adopted after the wave of
political pluralism that swept through Kenya in the early 1990s.
The advent of political pluralism the 1990s in Kenya ushered a ray of hope for the media
industry. Independent, privately-owned media outlets mushroomed and concentrated largely on
political coverage (Kanyinga, 2009). Prior to the wave of political pluralism, democratization,
and media liberalization, both government and independent media were heavily censored and
thus served as government mouthpiece. Dissent was criminalized and there were frequent open
clampdowns on critical press (Kanyinga, 2009). The leading newspapers at the time, The Daily
Nation and The Standard, were deemed as tools for political subversion by the government.
However, the unavoidable media liberalization witnessed in the 1990s led to a media boom,
characterized by establishment of more TV stations to counter the monopoly of the airwaves by
the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), a government-owned TV and Radio station seen as
a government propaganda tool (Mukhongo, 2009). KBC was “biased and tended to sanitize
government views and actions” (Amutabi, 2013, p. 12). However, the monopoly ended when the
Kenya Television Network (KTN) emerged as the alternative platform in the Kenyan airwaves; it
permeated the media market, and was embraced by Kenyans. More and more broadcast media
stations cropped up for television and radio, such as Royal Media (Citizen TV and Radio,
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Chamngei Radio, Mulembe Radio, Ramogi Radio, Hot 96 Radio, and Musyi Radio) , Radio
Africa (Capital TV and Radio, Radio Jambo, and Kiss TV), Media Max (K24 TV and Milele
Radio), Nation Media Group (NTV, Daily Nation Newspaper, Taifa Leo, and Capital FM
Radio), Standard Group (KTN, Radio Maisha, and Standard Daily Newspaper) (Amutabi, 2013).
Amutabi (2013) argues that in span of only 20 years, the Kenyan media landscape
changed forever to be one of the most vibrant independent media to the envy of other East
African countries and the entire African continent. Consequently, the Kenyan mass media have
played critical roles in civic engagement, political accountability, and the promotion of good
governance (Amutabi, 2013).
Media Effects on and Relationship with Politics
The news media are a critical player in the modern world, particularly in democratic
societies. The proliferation of news media in modern society has had a heuristic impact leading
to numerous studies examining its influence on and association with politics.
Civic and Political Engagement
Putnam (1995) examined the cultivation effects of television viewing by investigating the
relationship between media use and civic and political engagement. He argued that television
viewing is the leading cause of civic ills, including decreased social trust, lack of public interest,
and low participation in politics. He notes:
There is reason to believe that deep-seated technological trends are radically privatizing,
and individualizing, our use of leisure time, and thus disrupting many opportunities for
social capital formation. The most obvious and probably the most powerful instrument of
this revolution is television. (p. 75)
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Putnam’s view is based on the belief that the time spent watching television replaces the time
that would have been otherwise used to interact with other members of the community. This
conclusion is often referred to as a time-replacement effect. Heavy TV viewers, it has been
claimed, have a weaker sense of belonging to a specific community and exhibit limited political
efficacy in changing their prevailing conditions (Putnam, 2000).
Lee (2005) also found that European TV use was associated with lower political
participation. According to Lee, “Those who expose themselves to non-news television are
preoccupied with consumer culture and thus spend their free time discussing the newest iPod and
surfing Amazon.com, rather than reading the latest article on FactCheck.org” (p. 23). The media
serves as a source of information and the marketplace of ideas and also an agent of political
socialization. McLeod and Donald (1985), in an investigation of the relationship between voter
turnout and the media, posit that exposure and attention to hard news in the print media are
associated with voter turnout and other forms of participation. Other studies have demonstrated
that the use of TV for either entertainment or information may lead to divergent outcomes
regarding political participation. While the use of mass media for information is associated with
higher levels of participation, the opposite is true for entertainment use (Putnam, 2000).
Similarly, Newton (1999) found that watching films leads to decreased level of political
knowledge and political interest which has a direct impact on political participation. Consistent
with this is Holbert, Shah and Kwak’s (2003) study, which concluded that movies and soaps (i.e.
entertainment programs) do not influence political efficacy, interest, and participation.
On the other hand, some argue that the political news from television and newspapers
encourage civic and political involvement (Hooghe, 2002; Price & Cappella, 2002). “Television
transferred politics to the living room” and as such, has contributed to an expansion of audience
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for political news thus increasing political knowledge, interest, and participation (Gurevith,
Colemen, & Blumler, 2009, p. 166).
Public Trust in Government
Some scholars have also looked at the relationship between exposure to news media and
public’s trust in the government. Avery (2009) notes, “Media’s negativity, incivility, and lack of
substance have led to growing public distrust in government” (p. 2). This is what Robinson
(1976) refers to as ‘Videomalaise’, which he argues is the television’s ability to instigate political
cynicism. Robinson argues that the negativity and conflict found in the news makes the public to
be less trusting of the government. However, Norris (1996) holds an opposite view, and posits
that the modern ease of access to the media, and the variety thereof, promotes public trust in the
government. Further, she notes that people who are generally interested in politics will seek out
political news to acquire information and hence learn more about government and politics. Thus,
people who are normally politically engaged and trusting of government will seek even more
media, a move that will further strengthen their trust in government. On the other hand, those
who are cynical of politics and, therefore, less engaged, will choose to avoid any potential
influence and hence ignore the news media altogether. This leads to the question of whether
media have a positive or negative relationship with and influence on political trust. These stark
contrasts in opinion-based research call for further research on this topic. Thus, the purpose of
this study is to help fill this gap.
Patriotism
Lin (2009) notes that during the Iraqi war, the Pentagon gave journalists the permission
to report about the war while on the ground with the troops. As a result, the public received 24/7
news reporting about the invasion. During the pre-war period, according to Lin, the public
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cautiously supported the war. However, “once the war started in 2003, public support grew very
fast, and patriotic fervor took over” (p. 1). Lin also argues that the rallying calls through and by
the media produced patriotic feelings as well as allegiance toward the country and its flag.
Additionally, Lin posits that, by playing the cheerleading role during the war with more pro-war
views and little anti-war news, the media became a powerful force in pushing the rallying cry to
all Americans. The scholar also postulates that the Bush Administration helped build the media’s
agenda, and the media, in turn, helped build the public’s agenda to the point where most
Americans rallied to support the war in early 2003. This shows how the media can cultivate love
and support for one’s country and its initiatives.
Other than media’s coverage of war, scholars have investigated the role mediated sports
can play in promoting nationalized fervor. Billings, Brown, and Brown (2015) studied the
potential role of nationalism in the 2012 London Olympics, finding that people who were heavy
viewers of the 2012 London Olympics were more likely to exhibit higher levels of nationalism,
patriotism, and smugness than light viewers of Olympic media.
Negative Ethnicity
In Kenya racial bias is hardly an issue because the country is racially homogeneous, but
ethnic bias and nepotism take the place of racial bias. According to Oyugi (1997), the news
media fanned tribal animosity and hatred which led to the infamous inter-ethnic wars termed
post-election violence witnessed in 2008 in Kenya. Vernacular radio stations were criticized for
broadcasting hateful narratives that promoted ethnic bigotry. He further argues that Kenyan
politicians and tribal warmongers spread negative rhetoric through the media and exploited the
fragile ethnic tensions that exploded, leading to Kenyans butchering each other. Gīthīnji and
Holmquist (2012) also document that the mainstream media took sides during political
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campaigns giving prominence to news stories with total disregard to journalistic ethical and
professional standards.
Summary
Current research illustrates that the media’s relationship with and influence on political
attitudes and behaviors points to at least two directions: First, some scholars argue that the
ultimate association between the media and its influence on political participation, trust, and
national pride varies depending on the ‘form’ of the media because different forms of the media
serve different functions (Shah, Kwak, Holbert, 2001). For example, Television viewing
(Putnam, 2000) and Internet use have been indicated as the major causes of civic and political
inactivity, whereas newspaper reading has been found to increase political interest and thus
political participation and trust (Norris, 2000). The second direction that research demonstrates is
the influence of the media content, with suggestions that different content exert different
influences on political behaviors and attitudes. For instance, while watching science fiction and
reality shows on TV diverts people from social interactions and thus makes them politically
passive, long hours spent watching public affairs news on TV have been found to enhance
political participation (Norris, 1996). In addition, some studies indicate that watching situational
comedies has negative effects on local political participation (Shah, et al., 2001). These studies
illustrate that indeed, the media regardless of the form or the content, have an influence on
political attitudes and consequently political behaviors of its consumers.
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Research Questions
Research demonstrates that there are many variables under political culture that can be
explored. While all these variables could be examined, this study seeks to explore only four of
these variables (patriotism, trust, ethnicity, and political participation) and their relationship with
consuming the media.
According to Almond and Verba (1963), political trust and interest are essential
antecedents for political participation as it influences people’s reaction to public affairs and
perceived political legitimacy of governments. Researchers continue to debate whether the media
have positive or negative relationships and impact on political engagement. The controversy is
whether the media serve as a mobilizing force by informing the public about why, how, and
where the public should and can involve themselves in political processes hence leading to a
politically active citizenry (Norris, 1996; 2000) or whether the media are the cause of a declining
social capital and subsequently, reduced political participation as argued by Putnam (2000).
Thus, the divergence in opinions on the relationship between and impact of the media on
political participation begets the following question;
RQ1: What is the relationship between media consumption and political participation in
Kenya?
Previous literature documents that the media, through a barrage of negative coverage,
undermines public confidence in a political system, politicians, and political institutions and thus
promotes political cynicism. However, some scholars also assert that the media can instill public
confidence in political processes. Norris (1996) posits that attention to news is positively and
strongly associated with political knowledge which translates to increased participation as a well
as political trust in the government. Thus, a question is posed;
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RQ2: In what ways, if any, is media consumption associated with political trust in
Kenya?
Previous studies, particularly in America, demonstrate that the media through the
coverage of sports and war can promote patriotic feelings and attitudes. Lin (2009) argues that
the U.S. mainstream media played a key role in marshalling public support toward the Iraqi war.
Additionally, Billings, Brown, and Brown (2015) assert that people who watched the 2012
Olympics showed greater support and allegiance to the stars and stripes. Thus,
RQ3: What is the relationship between media consumption and national pride among
Kenyans?
Kenya is a multi-ethnic country with over 40 ethnic groups. Ethnicity is at the nerve of
Kenya’s polity as a means of gaining political support. Some researchers argue that the media in
Kenya have been a conduit of hate speech and consequently, are used to incite one ethnic group
against the other (Amutabi, 2013). Thus,
RQ4: Is there any relationship between media consumption and inter-ethnic attitudes
among Kenyans?
Conclusion
Overall, the purpose of this chapter was to summarize the existing literature and provide
a basis for the research questions and hypothesis posed. Scholars have documented that political
culture, operationalized as the orientations people hold toward a political system, varies across
the world. This study has summarized the American political culture which has been extensively
documented by political communicators and scientists as well as intercultural scholars. The
reviewed literature also ‘travelled south’ and documented the existing political culture in Latin
America. In addition, political cultures of two Asian countries, China and Singapore, two
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economic giants in the eastern hemisphere which empirically mirror each other, have been
reviewed. Aspersions have been cast on Africa as ‘the dark continent’ due to the paucity of
studies conducted in and about this vast continent. But this study seeks to provide an illumination
of the political culture in a specific African country, Kenya, and thus a review of the African
political culture and particularly, the Kenyan culture have been provided. Lastly, the relationship
between media exposure and its impact on political attitude formation and subsequent political
behaviors have been demonstrated through the summary of political communication research.
This chapter has demonstrated how a variety of mass communication factors may impact
political culture, leading to some specific research questions. The next chapter describes the
methods the researcher will use in answering those research questions.
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CHAPTER III: METHOD
The previous chapter established the theoretical grounding for the current study with a
review of current literature on the conceptualization of political culture, the American political
culture, political culture in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and finally, Kenya’s political culture.
Since the current study examines the relationship between media use and political culture in
Kenya, current research on the relationship between media consumption and political attitudes
and behaviors, conceptualized in this study as political culture, were also documented. This
chapter explains the process of data collection and analysis.
Participants
To test the perceived influence of the news media on the political attitudes and behaviors
in Kenya, operationalized herein as the Kenyan political culture, I use survey data collected from
206 Kenyans. In total, 320 Kenyans filled out the online questionnaire. However, only 206
participants satisfactorily completed the survey. The survey target population consists of 76.7%
Male, 22.8 % Female, with 0.5% choosing not to disclose their gender. Of those surveyed, 79.9%
identified as Native Kenyans (meaning they are born of native Kenyan parents), 0.5% as
multiracial; 14.7% did not wish to disclose their identity, with 4.9% choosing other. The most
frequent level of education achieved by the participants is a bachelor’s degree at 66%, followed
by a master’s degree (17%), a diploma (associate degree, 12.1%), high school (2.9%), and PhD
(1.9%). The average age of the participants was 29.05 years, ranging from 19 years old to 47
years old.
Since the study investigates the relationship between media consumption and political
attitudes and behaviors in Kenya, categorical data was collected about the forms of media
consumed by the participants. Most of the participants reported accessing their news via the
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Internet (n =141, 68.4%), followed by Television (n = 52, 25.2%), Newspapers (n = 10, 4.9%),
Radio (n = 2, 1%), and lastly, interpersonal interactions (n = 1, 0.5%).
Sampling Procedure
After attaining approval from the Institutional Research Board (IRB), I sent emails,
Facebook posts, and messages, and primarily, WhatsApp messages requesting Kenyans to
participate in the study by following the link to a university-hosted webpage attached to the
invitation message. I combined criterion and snowball sampling methods to ensure that the
participants were only Kenyans over the age of 18, who resided in Kenya, and not within the
European Economic Area. Upon clicking the link, the participants were directed to the informed
consent message where they would voluntary choose to participate in the study or decline. All
participants were requested to complete the survey and then forward it to other Kenyans. In this
way, a snowball sampling technique was utilized. All the respondents gave informed consent,
were notified that they could stop taking the survey at any time, and were assured that their
responses would remain anonymous. Moreover, I informed the participants that my study was
investigating their media consumption habits and political attitudes and behaviors.
Measures
Media Consumption
To measure the participant’s media consumption, comprised of the respondent’s
recollection of media use habits, a 9-item scale obtained from the 2000 National Annenberg
Election Survey and modified to suit this study’s research design was used. Media consumption
was measured following four distinct dimensions: watching the news on TV, reading newspaper
articles, listening to the news on the radio, and reviewing news on the Internet.
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TV news consumption. To obtain participant’s consumption of news from thes TV, the
following questions were posed: “On a normal day, how much time do you spend watching the
news on TV, reading a daily newspaper, listening to radio shows, reading news online?”
Responses to this item were coded on 8-point nominal levels where 1=No time, 2=Less than 15
minutes, 3=15-30 minutes, 4=30 minutes-1hour, 5=1-3 hours, 6=3-6 hours, 7=6-12 hours, 8=
more than 12 hours. Then, respondents were asked to report how much attention they paid
specifically to TV news: “How many days in a week do you watch news on TV? This item was
coded as follows; 1=One, 2=Two, 3-Three, 4=Four, 5=Five, 6=Six, 7=Seven.
Newspaper consumption. For newspaper article consumption, the following question
was asked: “How many days in a week do you read a daily newspaper?” This item was also
coded in a similar fashion; 1=One, 2=Two, 3-Three, 4=Four, 5=Five, 6=Six, 7=Seven.
Radio news consumption. For consumption of news through the radio, respondents were
asked; “How many days in a week do you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to
discuss current events, public issues or politics?” This item was coded as follows: 1=One,
2=Two, 3-Three, 4=Four, 5=Five, 6=Six, 7=Seven.
Online news consumption. A single item was also used to measure the respondents’
attention to and consumption of news from the Internet. They were asked, “How many days in a
week do you read political news stories online?” Similar coding scheme was followed.
To measure participant’s general attention to news across media platforms, an additional
4-item Likert-type scale (1= Strongly Agree, 7=Strongly Disagree) was incorporated. The
participants were asked to report the extent to which they agreed with the following statements:
(a) It’s a regular part of my day to catch up with the news, (b) I follow the news to understand
what’s going on in the world, (c) I follow the news to know what other people are talking about,
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(d) It’s my duty to keep up with what’s going on in the world, and (e) I have a pretty good
understanding of the main issues facing our country.
Political Interest and Participation
First, respondents were asked to report their interest in politics by answering a 6-item
scale, with questions such as “How interested would you say you are in politics?” The response
alternatives were 1=Very interested, 2= Somewhat interested, 3=Not very interested, 4=Not at all
interested, and 5= Don’t know. Secondly, the participants were asked about their political
affiliation: “On political matters, people often talk about NASA (National Super Alliance and
Jubilee). Generally, how would you place/identify your political affiliation?” Participants
answered this question using a 5-point Likert-type scale with responses including 1=NASA,
2=Jubilee, 3=Independent, 4= Other (specify), 5=Don’t know. To measure the participants’
levels of political participation, 4 items were used. Past and future participation in politics were
investigated by asking the respondents to indicate their responses to the following question:
The following are political actions people can take. Please indicate whether you have
participated in any of these actions, whether you might do it, or would never, under any
circumstances, do it: Signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawful
demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and voting.
The response alternatives included; 1=Have done it, 2=Might do it, 3=Never done it, 4=Would
never do it, 5=Don’t know. Similarly, the respondents were asked, “As of now, how likely are
you to vote in future elections (for example, by-elections or 2022 general elections)?” The
answers ranged from 1=Very Likely to 5=Not at all.
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Political Trust
Political trust is a composite of 16 items all measuring the levels of confidence or trust
Kenyans have in various political institutions. For instance, to measure trust in government in
Nairobi, respondents were asked, “Thinking of the national government, how much of the time
do you think you can trust the government to do the right thing?” Responses were coded on a 5item Likert-type scale with responses ranging from 1=Always to 5=Don’t know. The levels of
trust Kenyans have in various institutions were measured. These institutions include the
churches, the armed forces, labor unions, police, political parties, parliament, civil service,
presidency, Supreme Court, elected officials, and even prospective political candidates.
Previous research indicates that there is a growing distrust in the media by the public,
which could mean or lead to a lack of willingness to exert effort to seek and obtain knowledge
about national news and political information through the media (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996)
Thus, one’s trust in the media to report the news fairly could have an impact on whether or not
an individual consumes information via the media at all, or even which type of the media an
individual consumes the most. Therefore, to measure the level of confidence Kenyans have on
the Kenyan media, the following question was posed: “How much of the time can you trust the
media to report the news fairly?” with options being 1= Always, 2=Frequently, 3=Occasionally,
4=Rarely, 5=Never.
Patriotism
The levels of love for Kenya as reported by Kenyans was captured using the Patriotism
scale developed by Livingstone and Markham (2008) and used by Billings, Brown, and BrownDevlin (2015). The scale measured the degree to which the participant agreed or disagreed with 6
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items provided, such as “I love my country,” and “I am very proud to be from my country”, with
the response alternatives ranging from 1= Strongly Disagree to 5=Strongly Agree.
Ethnic Attitudes
The attitude of Kenyans toward members of other ethnicities was measured using the
Perceived Realism Scale (PRS) adopted and modified from a study by Punyanunt-Carter (2008)
on television viewers’ perceived realism perceptions of African Americans portrayals on
television. In the present study, African Americans were replaced with other ethnicities since
Kenya is a multi-ethnic society and is largely racially homogeneous. The items on this scale
included items such as “The media present negative attributes about other ethnicities as they
really are in life,” and “If I see other ethnicities on the media as untrustworthy, selfish, proud,
ignorant, I can’t be really sure they are really that way.” Responses were solicited using a 5point, Likert-type scale with responses ranging from 5=Strongly Disagree to 1=Strongly Agree.
Data Analysis
Data collected were analyzed quantitatively using the IBM Statistical Package for Social
Sciences statistics (SPSS-25). The data analysis process was conducted in a two-step systematic
fashion. First, scale reliability analyses were conducted for all the scales to ascertain the
consistency of participant responses. All the reliability tests and subsequent coefficients are
reported in the next chapter.
To answer all four research questions, a series of Pearson’s product-moment correlations
analyses were conducted to examine the relationships between media consumption and political
participation, political trust, patriotism, and inter-ethnic attitudes.
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Conclusion
This chapter has presented the procedures that were followed in this study. First, the
participants have been described in terms of descriptive statistics and the procedure followed
during their recruitment. Second, the sampling procedure has been explained. Third, the chapter
has also presented the measures used to capture the participants’ responses, and finally, the
process of data analysis has been described. The next chapter presents the results of the study.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
The previous chapter described the participants whose responses informed this chapter,
the procedures followed in their recruitment, the measures used, and the process followed in
analyzing the data. This chapter presents the results of the data analysis.
Scale Reliabilities
Reliability coefficients were calculated for all the variables present in the study with
multiple items. The political interest measures adopted from the 2000 National Annenberg
Election Survey had an alpha coefficient of .75, indicating a respectable reliability (Wrench,
Thomas-Maddox, Richmond, & McCroskey, 2013). Political participation measure adopted from
the same survey obtained a Cronbach’s alpha = .82. Political trust measure obtained a
Cronbach’s alpha = .87. Livingstone and Markham’s (2008) Patriotism Scale obtained a
Cronbach’s alpha = .96, indicating an excellent reliability according to Wrench, ThomasMaddox, Richmond, & McCroskey (2013). Lastly, the Perceived Realism Scale adopted from
Punyanunt-Carter (2008) had a reliability coefficient = .81 considered to be acceptable level of
reliability.
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations
During the bivariate analyses, I examined the relationships between media consumption
and patriotism, political participation, political trust, and inter-ethnic attitudes.
First, research question one asked if there is any relationship between media consumption
and political participation in Kenya. A Pearson product-moment correlation revealed that online
news consumption was negatively correlated with political participation, r(203) = -.27, p < .001.
Similarly, political interest, which is a strong predictor of political participation, was found to be
negatively correlated with online news consumption, r(203) = -.37, p < .001. In addition,
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political interest was negatively correlated with the number of hours spent watching TV, r(204)
= -.187, p < .001. There were no significant correlations found between political participation
and listening to radio, or reading newspapers. However, it is important to note that a positive
relationship was found between political interest and political participation, r(203) = .29, p <
.001. These are significant findings for reasons which will be explained in the discussion.
Research question two asked if there is any association between media consumption and
political trust in Kenya. A Pearson product-moment correlation conducted detected no significant
relationship between media consumption and political trust in Kenya.
Research question three asked whether there is a relationship between media
consumption and national pride among Kenyans. A Pearson-product moment correlation
revealed no significant relationship between media consumption and patriotism in Kenya.
Lastly, research question four asked if there is a relationship between media consumption
and inter-ethnic attitudes among Kenyans. Similar findings were drawn; that is, there was no
significant relationship found between media consumption and inter-ethnic attitudes among
Kenyans. See Table 1.
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Table 1. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for Media Consumption and Patriotism, Political Trust, Political Participation and
Inter-Ethnic Attitudes
Variables

Pearson
Correlation

Watching
TV-hours
Watching
TV-Days
Newspapers
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Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Radio
Pearson
Correlation
Online
Pearson
Correlation
Political
Pearson
participation Correlation
Ethnic
Pearson
attitudes
Correlation
Political
Pearson
Trust
Correlation
Political
Pearson
Interest
Correlation

Political
Watching Watching News
Political
Ethnic Political
Patriotism
Interest
TV-hours TV-Days papers Radio Online
participation attitudes Trust
1
.197**

1

-.082

.023

1

-.077

.072

.205**

1

.222**

.150*

.047

.129

-.073

.120

-.017

-.002

.051

.086

-.060

-.066

.052

.076

-.187**

-.066

.064

1

-.050 -.056 -.273**

.058

1

.013

-.270**

-.038

1

.066

.315**

-.082

-.292**

1

.023 -.373**

-.070

.293**

-.075

.106

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

1

Conclusion
This chapter has presented the results obtained from the survey and subsequent scale
reliability tests and correlations between the variables in the study. The next chapter will draw
conclusions based on these results, the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications in
to political communication research and practice while highlighting the limitations of the study.
Lastly, suggestions for future studies will be made. Taken together, the results show (a) a
negative correlation between online media consumption, political interest, and participation, (b) a
negative association between TV viewing and political interest, which is a strong predictor of
political participation, (c) no correlations between media consumption through TV viewing,
newspaper reading, listening to radio and patriotism, political trust, and inter-ethnic attitudes.
These results are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
Kenya’s political culture is well documented in the literature (Mukhongo, 2009: Shilaho,
2018). However, the relationship between the prevailing political attitudes and behaviors
(political culture) and self-reported media use habits in Kenya remains understudied. As such,
the purpose of this study is to investigate, explain, and thus, address a major limitation in
understanding Kenya’s political culture, namely the relationship and the perceived influence of
the Kenyan media on Kenya’s political culture. This study examines the relationship between
media consumption and the various variables that form a nation’s political culture within the
framework of media effects theories. While previous conceptualizations of political culture
include several aspects, this study concentrates on four major dimensions of political culture (a)
political interest and participation, (b) political trust, (c) patriotism, and (c) inter-ethnic attitudes
in Kenya.
I asked questions to establish the relationship between the media consumption habits by
Kenyans and the various aspects of political culture. To conclusively answer the research
questions posed, I conducted Pearson product-moment correlations.
Summary of Findings
Research Question One
The first research question asked if there is any relationship between media consumption
and political participation in Kenya. Results revealed a negative correlation between online
media consumption and political participation in Kenya. This revelation adds to the debate on
the socio-political consequences of Internet use. Some technologists and social critics surmise
that Internet users become increasingly removed from meaningful social relationships and less
likely to be active politically and in the community as they spend more time online (Shah,

48

Shmeirbach, Hawkins, Espino, & Donovan, 2002). These are the people who use the Internet for
recreational purpose (Shah et al.). On the other side of the spectrum, some research suggests that
those using the Internet for information, especially political information, exhibit higher levels of
political efficacy, knowledge, interest, and participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). This study
supports the former pessimistic view, that frequent Internet use by Kenyans could be associated
with people’s withdrawal from political life.
The negative association between media consumption and political participation also
advances the argument by Lee (2005) that “those who expose themselves to non-news television
are preoccupied with consumer culture and thus spend their free time discussing the newest iPod
and surfing Amazon.com, rather than reading the latest article on FactCheck.org” (p. 23). It also
aligns with the time displacement hypothesis by Robert Putnam (2000). According to Putnam,
television is the scapegoat for the declining political participation across the world and,
specifically, in America. Putnam argues that watching television drives down political
participation because the time spent watching television would otherwise be devoted to
interactions with other members of the community, discussions, and deliberations which could
spur political engagement. However, the negative correlation in Kenya does not support the
argument by some scholars who contend that media use has a positive relationship with and
influence on civic and political participation (Boulianne, 2009; Xenos & Moy, 2007).
This finding seems to imply that the proliferation of Internet connectivity has permeated
and altered almost all aspects of human life, and this apparently includes political life. By virtue
of this medium (the Internet), a new picture of politics is being drawn in Kenya, especially in
terms of political participation. Most of the sampled Kenyans reported accessing news via the
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Internet, and, based on the findings, this widespread Internet use in Kenya seems to herald a new
political culture, that of a politically disengaged and disinterested citizenry.
While there was no significant correlation found between watching television and
political participation in Kenya, it was interesting to discover that there is a negative correlation
between watching television and political interest as well as political interest and online news
consumption. Norris (1996) argues that interest in politics is a strong predictor of political
participation. The two negative associations point to a possibility that the more Kenyans
consume news online and by watching TV, the less interested they would be politically.
However, these could also be a segment of the society that are generally politically disinterested.
It is plausible to argue that those who are generally politically interested and engaged would pay
close attention to the news and, therefore, learn more about government and politics and even
participate more. The negative correlation between online news consumption and political
interest supports the conclusion by Xenos and Moy (2007) that Internet use and political
participation are contingent upon political interest as a key factor, hence the positive correlation
between political interest and participation, which supports Norris’ earlier assertion.
Another set of scholars argue that the Internet has a positive association with and
influence on political engagement. They posit that the Internet activates those citizens who are
generally predisposed and interested in politics (Polat, 2005); the Internet provides more
convenient ways of being politically engaged (for example, signing petitions) and mobilizes
politically inactive people (Krueger, 2002). They conclude that the Internet, reinvigorates civic
life by increasing access to political information, facilitating political discussion, and offering an
alternative venue for political expression, and engagement. The findings in Kenya do not support
this position.

50

There was no significant relationship found between newspaper reading, listening to
radio, and political participation. This finding seems to counter Norris’s (1996) contention that
exposure to hard news in the newspaper and radio have a strong positive correlation with
political interest and consequently, political participation as well as trust in public figures and
institutions. Lee and Wei (2008) found that a decrease in newspaper reading among baby
boomers and generation Y is associated with their decreasing political participation. They note
that there has been a decline in political participation through signing petitions, attending rallies
to voting in America. Young American’s political involvement has declined the most
precipitously (Lee & Wei, 2008). Ali and Fatima (2016) who found that newspaper reading
among Pakistani youth, which together with the Internet are the most preferred medium of
information seeking, are strongly and positively correlated with their political awareness,
knowledge, interest, and participation, which explains the healthy democratic system in Pakistan.
Similarly, among the British, newspaper reading and listening to radio was positively correlated
with voting (Livingstone and Markham, 2008). Livingstone and Markham found that active and
sustained engagement with the news through the papers makes the British people more likely to
vote. Extrapolated to the Kenyan context, the findings do not support the arguments by these
studies.
More recently, country level-voting rates in some African countries are positively
correlated with listening to radio, while people who listen to radio news frequently are more
likely to vote (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2010). This study does not support this conclusion by
Kuenzi and Lambright. A possible explanation for the lack of correlation between newspaper
use, listening to radio, and political participation in Kenya could be that these are just unique
theoretical constructs without any significant relationship or exposure to news in the papers and
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the radio do not influence Kenyans positively or negatively in their political participation
behaviors. Future research should explore conclusively the prevalence of newspaper readership
(or lack of it) among Kenyans to determine whether there has been a decline or an increase in
their newspaper readership culture and listening to radio even thought this study did not find any
relationship with political participation.
There has been an increasing disdain toward the media the world over. Public confidence
in the press has seen the steepest decline (Cooke & Gronke, 2007). Media bias is at the top of the
public’s complaints toward the media. I argue that it is possible that the same can be said of the
Kenyan press and perhaps Kenyans are aware of the influence that the newspaper and radio have
and do not want to succumb to it.
Research Question Two
The second research question asked if there is a relationship between media consumption
and political trust in Kenya. Past research is inconclusive on whether media use has any
significant relationship and influence on trust in the government, politicians, and public
institutions. This is because there are two polar-opposite arguments over the relationship
between media use and political trust. Some researchers argue that the media have a negative
relationship with and effect on trust, while others posit that the relationship between media
exposure and public trust is positive and reciprocal. Robinson (1976) suggests that distrust in
government is closely related to and could be a result of media’s incivility, negativity, and lack
of substance. He calls this “Videomalaise”. He further argues that television, specifically, has an
ability to instigate political cynicism through a barrage of negativism and, thus, to eat away the
trust that the public has in the government and politicians to solve societal issues. Norris (1996)
makes an opposite claim and proposes the “virtuous circle”. She argues that the ease with which
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people can access and the availability of a variety of media available to the public engender
political trust.
With such dramatically different conclusions, what does the current study reveal about
political trust in Kenya? The findings do not support either thesis, as there was no significant
relationship found between political trust and media use in Kenya.
Research Question Three
The third research question asked whether there is any relationship between media
consumption and national pride among Kenyans. There was no association found between media
use and patriotism among Kenyans. This could possibly indicate two things. First, Kenyans just
love their country regardless of the amount of media they consume. This is demonstrated by a
mean of 4.16 on a five-point scale with higher scores translating to high patriotic fervor. Second,
even if the media were to only highlight stories that promote negativity and despair or even
positive stories about the country, regardless of coverage, Kenyans would not flinch in their love
for the red, green, black, and white colors of the flag. In other words, these two variables, media
consumption and patriotism, are unique theoretical constructs that do not seem to have a
significant relationship, at least in the Kenyan case.
Some past research offers conflicting conclusions on whether media consumption is
correlated with and influences nationalistic attitudes and qualities. For instance, Lin (2009)
conducted a study on Americans’ consumption of news about the Iraqi war and noted heightened
patriotic values and feelings during that time. Billings, Brown, and Brown-Devlin (2015), on the
other hand, conducted a somewhat similar study regarding Americans’ consumption of Olympic
media and their nationalistic attitudes and feelings. They noted that “Olympic media
consumption does not seem to have a relationship with nationalism nearly as much” (p. 16). The
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Kenyan case does not support either direction. However, going by the study conducted by
Billings et al. (2015), future studies should explore the specific content that Kenyans watch on
television, read on newspapers, listen to on the radio, and consume online for any significant
relationships with their levels of nationhood.
Research Question Four
Research question four asked if there is any relationship between media consumption and
inter-ethnic attitudes among Kenyans. There was no significant relationship found between
media use habits and attitudes among and toward Kenyans of different ethnicities. RQ3 was
posed because past research shows Kenya’s politics is founded based on ethnic mobilization and
polarization. One cannot understand Kenya’s political sphere without first an appreciation of the
role played by ethnic identity and association (Mohamed, 2017; Mukhongo, 2009). Most
Kenyans often support a candidate from their own ethnic extraction because they trust him or
her. Mohamed (2017) reported in an Aljazeera newspaper article that “almost all the voters who
spoke to Al Jazeera in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, said they are voting for candidates from their
own ethnic extraction out of ‘fear’ of someone other than their own taking office and lack of
‘trust’ in candidates from other ethnic groups.” In addition, “ethnic politics is of relevance to
Kenya’s politicians who, together with the intelligentsia, instrumentalize ethnicity in contestation
for political power and economic opportunities” (Shilaho, 2018, p. 2).
Ethnicity transcends national issues and class interests in Kenya. I, therefore, questioned
whether it could be that Kenyans do not trust political candidates from other ethnic groups and,
therefore, are apprehensive to vote for them based on their perceptions due to portrayals in the
media. While there was sufficient theoretical reason to ask whether there was any association
between Kenyans’ media use habits and their attitudes towards other ethnicities, no significant
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relationship in either direction was found. Past research (Ajulu, 2002; Kanyinga, 2014;
Mukhongo, 2009) demonstrate that ethnicity is salient in Kenyan politics, it is the fulcrum of
political power. Kenyans have been socialized since independence to believe that the most
significant consideration for political office is a candidate’s ethnicity. Ostensibly, Kenyans have
embraced political rhetoric that electing one of their own guarantees state resources and better
opportunities. Therefore, I argue that the lack of significant association between media use and
inter-ethnic attitudes could be due to the entrenched distrust in ethnic outgroups as a result of
illiteracy, high trust in politicians, and prejudice and is not necessarily due to the portrayals of
these ethnic groups by the media which the public consume. Regardless of the media
consumption by Kenyans, which may positively or negatively portray other ethnic groups,
Kenyans will still favor co-ethnic politicians thus perpetuating the politicization of ethnicity in
Kenya.
Interestingly, inter-ethnic attitudes were negatively correlated with political trust. This
finding seems to suggest that the perceptions Kenyans have of other ethnic groups may not
necessarily be influenced by the media, since media consumption (in all its forms) did not have a
relationship with inter-ethnic attitudes, but they (Kenyans) inherently do not trust people from
other ethnic groups such as politicians. This confirms the report by Mohamed (2017) suggesting
the entrenched distrust among and toward different ethnicities, in matters of politics, in Kenya.
On this issue, future research should explore more closely the effects that a specific media form
(particularly radio or TV) or content (e.g., comedies) and channels have on inter-ethnic attitudes
and behaviors portrayed by Kenyans. In addition, there are widespread vernacular radio and TV
stations in the country that provide a treasure trove of opportunities for future research into the
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relationships and potential impacts of consuming content from such stations on the attitudes
toward other Kenyan ethnicities.
Implications
The findings from this study have theoretical and methodological implications that may
help guide further research on media effects and political communication. In addition, practical
implications for the political communication and media industry, particularly in Kenya, will be
noted.
Theoretical Implications
Theoretically, this study expands political communication and media effects research into
a different, under-researched context, Kenya. The relationship between and the impact of media
consumption and political attitudes and behaviors have been a matter of recurrent concern in
communication research. However, most of these studies have been largely conducted in the
west, with very little to none exploring these relationships and effects in the continent of Africa,
and more specifically, in Kenya. Thus, this study helps to illuminate the media’s relationship
with political attitudes and behaviors in a different context, with results revealing interesting yet
unique associations.
First, the present study revealed that online media consumption was negatively correlated
with political interest and political participation, which is consistent with the argument that
online media use encourages increased isolation and exclusion from other aspects of life,
political life included (Shah, Shmeirbach, Hawkins, Espino, & Donovan, 2002). However, the
finding counters the suggestion by some researchers that there is no relationship between online
news consumption and political participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). The study provided
strong theoretical support to Shah et al.’s (2002) argument that there is indeed a relationship
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between online media consumption and political behaviors, albeit a negative relationship, and
this time, in Kenya.
Sweeping arguments have been made by different researchers about the relationship
between television viewing and political participation. Putnam (2000) blames the advent of
television and the amount of time spent watching television as the sole cause for an increasingly
politically disengaged public. Norris (1996) however, in a reply to Putnam, argues that the attack
on television as the sole cause of social ills ranging from violence among children to racism,
illiteracy, alienation, lack of civic, and political engagement is unfounded. Despite the
pervasiveness of television use in modern families, the relationship between watching television
and political participation is more complex than suggested (Norris,1996). The finding in this
study, which shows no significant correlation between watching television and political
participation, does not provide theoretical support in either direction, on whether it is a complex
relationship (Norris, 1996) or straightforward relationship as Putnam (2000) posits. This calls for
further replication studies to fully make certain the conclusion of this study.
The results related to the relationship between watching television and political interest
have some interesting theoretical implications. Despite television viewing and political
participation having no direct significant relationship, political interest, which is a strong
predictor of political participation (Norris, 1996), is negatively correlated with watching
television. Specifically, watching television has no association with being politically engaged
among Kenyans, while watching television has a negative correlation with being interested
politically. This runs counter to current research: One can be politically interested and, thus, be
proactive in seeking out news (probably political news), but this has no relationship with their
political participation. A possible explanation could be that the relationship between watching
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television and political participation should be measured differently, perhaps by looking at the
contents or specific channels and content that Kenyans watch. Based on this finding, it remains
unclear what this implies for the general claims on the relationship and impact of television on
political behaviors (interest and participation).
Given that modern-day television industry affords its viewers an array of programs from
which to choose, future research should go beyond measuring media consumption solely based
on time spent on a specific medium and investigate the relationships between watching specific
programs on TV such as sitcoms, political news, current affairs, and reality TV shows, and
political attitudes and behaviors. In addition, future studies should look at the motives for which
Kenyans seek out the media, especially TV. Here, the future research should answer the
following questions: How do Kenyans seek to fulfill their information or entertainment needs?
And consequently, what relationship does seeking such needs have with political knowledge and
interest, which influence political participation and other political behaviors? Lastly, not just the
types of programs but also the TV stations and or channels being watched should be explored.
Such research, then, would likely use a uses and gratifications perspective to better understand
Kenyan media use.
I have called for further research to add to the uses and gratifications perspectives in
political media effects, but I also suggest that this study adds to the expansive uses and
gratifications research which contends that the audience are active seekers of media content in
multiple forms to satisfy their informational, entertainment, escapism, and social interaction
needs (Diddi & La Rose, 2006). Some studies support a positive relationship between media use
(especially social media, TV, and newspaper use) and forms of political and civic involvement,
claiming that the use of these media for informational, relational, and expressive purposes have
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the potential to trigger political engagement (Chen, Chan & Lee, 2016; Chen, 2017; Chen &
Chan, 2017). For example, Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, and Jin (2012) demonstrates that individuals who
are motivated to seek out information on politics and current affairs online tend to be more
politically and civically engaged. In the same vein, some other scholars suggest that informationseeking motives are positively associated with individual’s likelihood to be involved politically
(Zhao, Lin, Liu &Yang, 2013). The findings from Kenya point to an opposite direction; online
media consumption (speculatively for recreational purposes) does not engender political activity
but instead seems to encourage passivity and lack of interest in politics. Future research should
investigate the motives behind accessing and consuming the media in relation to Kenyans’
political attitudes and behaviors.
The media’s relationship with political trust has been understood either in terms of
Robinson’s (1976) videomalaise or Norris’ (1996) virtuous circle hypotheses. The former blames
the media as the cause of distrust in government while the later counters Videomalaise with the
premise that the ease of accessibility and variety of media forms and content engender political
trust. This study supports neither of the hypotheses. However, more studies should be conducted
in future to determine any limiting factors that could have led to the current conclusion.
On media consumption and patriotism, this study did not find any significant relationship.
A possible explanation for this is that participants were not asked to report on the type of content
they consumed that could foster or diminish nationalistic attitudes. Billings et al. (2015) found
that when Americans watched the winter Olympics, there were no heightened patriotic feelings
reported while Lin (2009) found that Americans supported the red, white, and blue more during
the coverage of the Iraqi war by the American media. Thus, future studies in Kenya should
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explore the specific media content being selected and consumed in relation to the patriotic
feelings harbored by Kenyans.
Lastly, there was no significant relationship between media use and inter-ethnic attitudes
in Kenya. This finding does not seem to support Oyugi’s (1997) argument that the Kenyan media
have been sowing seeds of disharmony and discord among Kenyans. However, it is important to
note that Gīthīnji and Holmquist (2012) suggest that the Kenyan media have been biased in their
coverage particularly on political hot-topics, thus propagating distrust among different ethnicities
in Kenya. This could be a possible explanation for the negative correlation between inter-ethnic
attitudes and political trust in Kenya. Media’s impact on, rather than relationship with,
perceptions of other ethnicities should be investigated in future. This may provide clearer
explanations as to whether Kenyans consume the media with preconceived notions and
preconceptions about other ethnicities, and thus, seek a reinforcement of the same from the
media or the media influences the initial formation of stereotypes and attitudes.
The negative correlations between online media consumption, watching television with
political interest and participation seems to engender a parochial-subject political culture in
Kenya. This type of political culture is described by Almond and Verba (1963) as one
characterized by passive citizenry who have low political efficacy, low political interest, and
limited political participation.
Methodological Implications
This study drew its findings from those who could mainly access social media (Facebook
and WhatsApp) and emails, which were the primary means of survey distribution. Hence, when
interpreting the political behaviors and attitudes in relationship with media exposure in Kenya
which are constitutive knowledge of Kenya’s political culture, one should be aware of this
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limitation. Consequently, a big sample of Kenya’s populace that could not access social media
was left out which draws in the knowledge-gap hypothesis. According to the knowledge-gap
hypothesis, when mediated information enters a social system, it leads to an increase in the
existing knowledge gap between those of a higher and lower social economic status (Eveland,
Dietram, & Scheufele, 2000). The hypothesis presumes that there is an initial existence of a gap
in knowledge between the “haves” and “have nots” in the society. It, therefore, follows that the
Kenyans who completed the survey could be from relatively higher economic status who could
afford to access the internet and are more knowledgeable politically while those who could not
access social media may potentially be from lower economic status without the ability to access
the internet, and are possibly less politically informed. The net effect of this “deprivation of
knowledge” may lead to deprivation of ability to contribute to such studies, low political
efficacy, knowledge, participation, and even political power. This speculation is something that
future studies should investigate conclusively.
Moreover, a “one-shot” study like this might not have thoroughly captured and explained
the relationship between media consumption and political behaviors and attitudes. If one were to
conduct a longitudinal study, it is possible that causal explanations could be provided, providing
the ability to better explain the influence of media use on Kenya’s political culture. Further work
is needed to gain a better understanding of the relational and causal dynamics between the
various variables in the study.
Another methodological drawback in the study is the scales used. While the scales were
borrowed from existing surveys and reworded to fit the current study, it is possible that this
created some confusion in the respondents, which would provide a possible explanation for the
low reliabilities reported in some of the scales.
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This study explored the salience of ethnicity in Kenya’s political culture and its
relationship with the media use habits of the Kenyan people. However, I did not explicitly
address the ethnic extraction of the respondents in relation to their political trust, interest in
politics, and participation. Past research shows that Kenyans often vote for a political candidate
from a similar ethnic background because of the supposed trust in the candidate to fight for and
protect their interests. It, therefore, follows that this will influence their perception of politicians
from ethnic outgroups and the likelihood to participate in political life. Kenyans are more likely
to turn out in large numbers to vote for co-ethnic politicians and vice-versa. I theorized that
perhaps the Kenyan media socializes the masses with political cynicism toward other ethnic
groups. This was partly supported by the negative correlation between ethnic attitudes and
political trust. However, since I did not find any significant relationship between media use and
inter-ethnic perceptions, future research should explore the case and effect dynamics between the
media, ethnicity, political interest, and participation.
Finally, this study did not investigate the role of media content. Media consumption was
just measured based on the time spent watching television in hours and days, time spent online
reading news, time listening to radio, and time spent reading newspapers. Future studies should
examine more specifically the content such as sitcoms, reality TV shows, political podcasts,
debates, talks shows, and political news and how these genres relate with political behaviors and
attitudes. This is because the modern television market is saturated with content that could have a
relationship with and impact on politics.
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Practical Implications
Despite the methodological drawbacks noted above, the study’s findings have some
notable practical implications for Kenya’s media industry, media and communication scholars,
and the political communication industry in Kenya.
First, media are a key component for a functioning democratic political system. They
play an integral and crucial role in informing the masses and being government watchdogs. If
indeed, the media (such as the Internet and watching TV) in their role do not engender a
proactive citizenry, politically, to what extent then are the media fulfilling their role as agents in
the growth of the Kenyan democracy?
The relationship between media consumption and certain political behaviors and attitudes
is well documented. This study found that online media consumption is negatively correlated
with political participation and political trust. Additionally, watching television is negatively
correlated with political interest. Lower political interest will certainly have an impact on
political participation. These findings should worry a growing democracy like Kenya. If the
citizens continue to be politically cynical, they will most likely be politically passive. With a
citizenry that is relatively young and politically lethargic, the country’s future would seem bleak.
Also, it seems that the Kenyan media played into the Videomalaise theory of being uncivil,
negative, and biased thus explain the cynical Kenyan populace. Journalists should re-evaluate
their role in entrenching this attitudes and behaviors.
Political strategists, communicators, and media experts can glean a lot from this study.
First, while the findings that online media use was negatively correlated with political
participation, and political interest, as well as the negative correlation between watching
television with political interest, this should not be interpreted as a validation of the power of the
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Internet and the Kenyan television. Rather, one should be careful to note that media use is selfselected. Kenyans who are generally politically disinterested and disengaged will most likely
find political news unappealing and may remain politically passive. However, the fact that most
Kenyans reported accessing news via the Internet provides a possible resource for political
strategists and campaigners to reach out to this important block of the citizenry especially as the
world witnesses the immense impact of Twittersphere and Facebook rhetoric. Ostensibly, not all
Kenyans are politically passive, and thus, could political activism through the more commonly
used electronic and social media could tilt the scales in a democratic process.
Conclusion
I believe this study has contributed to a better understanding of the relationship between
media consumption and political culture in Kenya. A country’s political culture is an outcome of
shared political values, political attitudes, and behaviors. This study has established that the
media, particularly the Internet and television, have a negative association with political
participation and political interest in Kenya. Political participation is the hallmark of democracy;
it is the means through which a country can grow and develop and through which people can
voice their concerns and exercise their constitutional rights. The media clearly have an integral
role in the growth and strengthening of a democracy. Perhaps future studies will authoritatively
opine on this matter; for now, they seem to be discouraging participation, while encouraging
passivity.
To sum up, while this study investigated the relational dynamics between media use and
political attitudes that constitute Kenya’s political culture, the news media and the Internet
should not by any means be labelled the sole cause or even the major culprit for the problems
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reported. The responsibility for the political ills could stem from other areas and players who
have a “joint custody of democracy” who must share the blame.

65

REFERENCES
Ajulu, R. (2002). Politicized Ethnicity. Competitive politics and conflict in African studies,
61(1), 251–268.
Ali, R., & Fatima, A. (2016). Social media, newspapers and political awareness of youth in
Pakistan. Pakistan Library & Information Science Journal, 47(1), 30–41.
Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Amutabi, M. N. (2013). Media boom in Kenya and celebrity galore. Journal of African Cultural
Studies, 25(1), 14-29. doi:10.1080/13696815.2013.7653
Arce, M. (2003). Political violence and presidential approval in Peru. Journal of Politics, 65(2),
72–83.
Avery, J. (2009.) Videomalaise or virtuous circle? The influence of the news media on political
trust. International Journal of Press/Politics,4(4), 27-44
Baldwin, J. R., Faulkner, S. L., Hecht, M. L., & Lindsley, S. L. (Eds.). (2006). Redefining
culture: Perspectives across the disciplines. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Barnett, G.A. (1988). Communication and organizational culture. In G.M. Goldhaber & G.A.
Barnett (Eds.) Handbook of organizational communication (pp.101-130). Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Basedau, M. & Stroh, A. (2007): Ethnicity as a determinant of party preference and voting
behavior in francophone Africa. Unpublished conference paper prepared for the 4th
ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 06.-08.09.2007.
Bennett, W. L. (1980) Public Opinion in American Politics. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich

66

Billings, A., Brown, K., & Brown-Devlin, N. (2015). Sports draped in the American flag: Impact
of the 2014 winter Olympic telecast on nationalized attitudes. Mass Communication &
Society, 18(4), 377–398. doi.10.1080/15205436.2014.995767
Bobo, L. & Dawson, M. (2009). A change has come: Race, politics, and the path to the Obama
presidency. W.E.B. Du Bios Institute for Africa and African American Research
Booth, J. & Richard, P. (2011). Economic crisis and political attitudes in Latin America and the
Caribbean. A paper presented during the Midwest Political Science Association
Congress, Chicago, Illinois
Boulianne, S. (2009). Does internet use affect engagement: A meta-analysis of research. Political
Communication, 26(2),193-211.
Bratton, M., & Kimenyi, M. S. (2008). Voting in Kenya: Putting ethnicity in
perspective. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2(2), 272–289. doi
10.1080/17531050802058401
Call, C. T. (2008). The fallacy of the ‘Failed State’. Third World Quarterly, 29(8), 1491-1507.
Carlson, E. (2015). Ethnic voting and accountability: A choice experiment in Uganda. World
Politics,67, 353–385.
Cebula, R., Payne, J., & Saltz, I. (2017). Determinants of geographic voter participation rate
differentials: The 2014 mid-term election. Atlantic Economic Journal, 45(1), 35.
doi.org/10.1007/s11293-016-9525-3
Chang, P. (2015). In Xi Jinping’s crackdown on civil society, even women’s rights activists
aren’t spared. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/
comment/insight-opinion/article/1739150/xi-jinpings-crackdown-civil-society-evenwomensrights

67

Chan, M., Wu, X., Hao, Y., Xi, R. & Jin, T. (2012). Microblogging, online expression, and
political efficacy among young Chinese citizens: The moderating role of information and
entertainment needs in the use of Weibo. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social
Networking, (15), 345-349.
Chan, J.M. (1994). Media internationalization in China: Processes and tensions. Journal of
Communication, 44, 70-88.
Chia, Y. T. (2016). Singapore general election 2015 and the role of citizenship education.
The Round Table, 105(2), 149–160. doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2016.1154382
Chew, J. (1988) Moral education in a Singapore secondary school. Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, Monash University.
Chen, Y. (2017). WeChat use among Chinese college students: exploring gratifications and
political engagement in China. Journal of International and Intercultural
Communication, (10)1, 25-43.
Chen, Z. & Chan, M. (2017). Motivations for social media use and impact on political
participation in China: A cognitive and communication mediation approach.
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 20(2), 83-90.
Chen, H.T., Chan, M. & Lee, F. L. (2016). Social media use and democratic engagement: a
comparative study of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Chin. Chinese Journal of
Communication, (9), 348-366.
Crook, R. C. (1997). Winning coalitions and ethno-regional politics: The failure of the
opposition in the 1990 and 1995 elections in Côte d'Ivoire. African Affairs, 96, 215-242

68

Croucher, S., Otten, R., Ball, M., Grimes, T., Ainsworth, B., Begley, K., & Corzo, L. (2013).
Argumentativeness and political participation: A cross-cultural analysis in the United
States and Turkey. Communication Studies, 64(1), 18–32.
doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2012.727942
Cooke, T. E. & Gronke, P. (2007). Disdaining the media: The American public’s changing
attitudes toward the news. Political Communication, 24, 259-281.
De Silva, F. C., Clark, T., & Vieira, M.B. (2015). Political culture. The International
Encyclopedia of Political Communication. doi: 10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc161
Democracy clings on in a cold economic climate (2002, August 15). The Economist. Retrieved
from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2002/08/15/democracy-clings-on-in-acold-economic-climate
Diddi, A. & LaRose, R. (2010). Getting hooked on news: Uses and gratifications and the
formation of news habits among college students in an internet environment. Journal of
Broadcasting and Electronic media, 50, 193-210.
Elazar, D. J. (1994). The American Mosaic. Boulder, CO: WesTView Press
Encarnación, O. G. (2003). The strange persistence of Latin American democracy. World Policy
Journal, 20(4), 30–40.
Eveland, W. & Scheufele, A.D. (2000). Connecting news media use with gaps in knowledge and
participation. Political Communication, 17, 215-237.
Garrido, M. (2017). Why the poor support populism: The politics of sincerity in Metro
Manila. American Journal of Sociology, 123(3), 647–685. doi-10.1086/694076
Gīthīnji, M., & Holmquist, F. (2012). Reform and political impunity in Kenya: Transparency
without accountability. African Studies Review, 55, 53-74. doi:10.1353/arw.2012.0006

69

Gudykunst, W. B., & Ting-Toomey S. (1988). Culture and interpersonal communication.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Gurevith, M., Coleman, S. & Blumler, J. (2009). Political communication: Old and new media
relationships. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
625(1), 15-39.
Holbert, R. L., Shah D. V., & Kwak, N. (2003). Political implications of prime-time drama and
sitcom use: Genres of representation and opinions concerning women’s rights. Journal of
Communication, 53, 45-60.
Hooghe, M. (2002). Watching television and civic engagement. Disentangling and effects of time,
programs, and stations. Harvard International Journal of Press? Politics,7, 84-104.
Hunter, J. D. & Bowman, C. (1996). The State of disunion. Charlottesville, VA: Educational
Foundation
Inglehart, R. (1988). The Renaissance of Political Culture. American Political Science
Review, 82, 1203–1230
Ipsos Synnovate (n.d.). Trust in public institutions. Kenya. Retrieved from
https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/trust-public-institutions
Kanyinga, K. (2014). Kenya: Democracy and political participation. Nairobi, NRB: Open
Society Initiative for Eastern Africa.
Kanyinga, K. (2009) The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity, and post-2007
election violence in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27(3): 325–344.
Kenski, K. & Stroud, N. J. (2006). Connections between Internet use and political efficacy,
knowledge, and participation. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 50(2), 173192.

70

Kluver, R. (2014). Political culture and information technology in the 2001 Singapore general
election. Political Communication, 21, 435-458, doi: 10.1080/10584600490518333
Klopp, J. (2013). Ethnic clashes and winning elections: The case of Kenya’s electoral despotism.
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 35, 473-517.
Koonings, K. & Kruijt, D. (2003). Latin American political armies in the twenty-first
century. Bulletin of Latin American Research,3, 371-384
Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckholm, C. (1952). Culture: A critical review of conceptions and
definitions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Krueger, B. (2002). Assessing the potential of Internet political participation in the United States.
American Politics Research, 30, 476-498.
Kuenzi, M. & Lambright, G. (2010). Voter turnout in Africa? An examination of electoral
participation in 10 African countries. Party Politics, 17, 767-799.
Lee, T. (2005). Media effects on political disengagement revisited: A multiple-media approach.
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 2(82), 416-433
Lee, T & Wei, L. (2008). How newspaper readership affects political participation. Newspaper
Research Journal, 29(3).
Li, L. (2004). Political trust in rural China. Modern China, 30(2), 228-258.
Lin, C. A. (2009). Selective news exposure, personal values, and support for the Iraq war
Communication Quarterly, 57(1), 18–34
Livingstone, S. & Markham, T. (2008). The contribution of media consumption to civic
participation. The British Journal of Sociology, 59(2), 77-112.
Lonsdale, J. (1992). The political culture in Kenya. The Royal African Society, 87-108

71

Lynch, G. (2007). Negotiating ethnicity: Identity politics in contemporary Kenya. Review of
African Political Economy, 33(107), 49-65.
McClosky, H. & Zaller, J. (1987). The American ethos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
McCombs, M. E. & Shaw. D L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. The Public
Opinion Quarterly, 2, 176-187
McLaughlin, Eric S. (2007): Beyond the racial census. The political salience of ethnolinguistic
cleavages in South Africa. Comparative Political Studies,40(4), 435-456
McLeod, J. M., & McDonald, D. (1985). Beyond simple exposure: Media orientations and their
impact on political process. Communication Research, 12, 3-33.
Miller, N. & Yeager, R. (1994): The quest for prosperity. Boulder, CO. WesTView.
Mitchell, A. S. (2000). Toward a model of democratic stability: Political culture in Central
America. Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe,11(2): 5-29.
Moemeka, A. (1996). Interpersonal communication in communalistic societies in Africa. In W.
Gudykunst, S. Ting-Toomey, & N. Tsukada (Eds.), Personal communication across
cultures (197-214). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mohamed, H. (2017, August 6). Kenyan elections: The ethnicity factor. Aljazeera. Retrieved
from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/kenyan-elections-ethnicityfactor-170806081143385.html
Mukhongo, L.L. (2009). The Kenyan media: confronting state terror and atrocities. Journal of
communication and Language Arts, 3(1), 26–43.
Mutalib, H. (2000). Illiberal democracy and the future of opposition in Singapore. Third World
Quality, 21(2), 313–342.

72

Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2016, March 18). Leading economic indicators. Retrieved
from https://www.knbs.or.ke/inflation/
Newton, K. (1999) Mass media effects: Mobilization or media malaise? British Journal of
Political Science. (29), 577-599.
Norris, P. (1996). Does television erode social capital? A reply to Putnam. Political Science and
Politics, 29(3), 474-480.
Norris, P. (2000). A virtuous circle. Political communications in postindustrial societies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Nwosu, P. (2005). Understanding African conceptualization of intercultural competence. In
Deardorff, Darla K. (Eds.) (2009) The Sage handbook of intercultural competence.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
Ong, T.C., (1979). Report on Moral Education. Singapore: Ministry of Education.
Oyugi, W. (1997). Ethnicity in the electoral process: The 1992 general elections in Kenya.
African Journal of Political Science, 2(1), 41–69.
Oyugi, W., Wanyande, P. & Odhiambo-Mbai, C. (2008). The Politics of transition in Kenya:
From KANU to NARC. Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation.
Pew research center for the people and the press. (2009). Values Survey. Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center
Polat, R. K. (2005). Internet and political participation. European Journal of Communication, 20,
435-459.
Price, V. & Capella, J. N. (2002). Online deliberation and its influence. The electronic dialogue
project in campaign 2000. IT & Society, 1, 303-329.

73

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of democracy,
6(1). 65-78
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New
York, NY: Touchstone.
Rae, P. (2001). Review of theater and the politics of culture in contemporary Singapore. Arts
Magazine, 83-88.
Robinson, M. J. (1976). Public affairs television and the growth of political malaise. American
Political Science Review,70, 409-432.
Salinas, E. & Booth, J. (2011). Miro-social and contextual sources of democratic attitudes in
Latin America. Journal of politics in Latin America, 3(1), 29-64.
Salinas, E. & John, A. B. (2009). Contextual and micro-social sources of democratic norms in
Latin America. Paper presented at the Midwest Conference of Latin American Studies,
Dallas, Texas, 20 November.
Sanders, K. (2009). Communicating politics in the twenty-first century. New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan
Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. E. (1999). Civic participation and the equality
problem. In T. Skocpol & M. P. Fiorina (Eds.), Civic engagement in American
democracy (427-460). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Shah, D.V., Kwak, N. & Holbert, R. L. (2001). Connecting and disconnecting with civic life:
Patterns of Internet use and production of social capital. Political Communication, 18,
141-162.

74

Shah, D.V., Shmeirbach, M.G., Hawkins, J., Espino, R., & Donovan, J. (2002). Non-recursive
models of Internet use and community engagement: Questioning whether time spent
online erodes social capital. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 79, 964987.
Shilaho, W.K. (2018). Political power and tribalism in Kenya. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J. & Marcus, G. E. (1982). Political tolerance and American
democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Swedlow, B. (2011). Editor’s introduction: Cultural theory’s contributions to political science.
Political Science & Politics, 44 (4), 703–10.
Twaweza East Africa (2017, June 12). Constitution, devolution, and inclusion: Citizen’s views
on governance in Kenya. Retrieved from https://www.twaweza.org/go/szw-governance2017-ke.
Ugur, M. (2014). Corruption’s direct effects on per-capita income growth: A meta-Analysis.
Journal of Economic Surveys, 28(3): 472-490
Welsh, B. (2015) Singapore swing. New Mandala. Retrieved from
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/09/12/singa pore-swing
Wilson, R. W. (1997). American political culture in comparative perspective. Political
Psychology, 18(2), 483–502.
World values survey (2010). Wave 6. Retrieved from
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp
Wrench, J., Thomas-Maddox C., & Richmond, V. P. (2012). Quantitative research methods for
communication: A hands-on approach. Buffalo, New Yok: Oxford University Press.

75

Xenos, M. & Moy, P. (2007). Direct and differential effects of the internet on political and civic
engagement. Journal of Communication, 57(4), doi.org/10.1111/j.14602466.2007.00364.x
Yengoyan, A. A. (1989). Culture and ideology in contemporary Southeast Asian Societies.
Unpublished manuscript. Environment and Policy Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu,
Hawaii.
Zechmesiter, E. (2014). (Ed). The political culture of Democracy in the Americas: Democratic
governance across 10 years of the Americas Barometer. US-Aid, US: Vanderbilt
University
Zhao, M., Lin, J., Liu, Y., & Yang, L. (2013). The effects of Weibo use on political trust and
social trust among college students in mainland China. Paper presented at the IAMCR
2013 Conference Dublin, June 25-29.

76

APPENDIX A: EMAIL INVITATION
Dear Prospective Participant,
I am a graduate student in the School of Communication at Illinois State University and
as part of a Master’s thesis, I am conducting a study about people’s news media consumption. To
participate, you must be over the age of 18, Kenyan citizen, or lived in Kenya for at least 15
years. You must not be currently residing in the European Economic Area (EEA).
Your participation is completely voluntary, and anything you answer in the survey will
remain completely anonymous. There is no penalty for choosing not to participate in this study.
Furthermore, you have the right to decline to answer any question or withdraw from the study at
any time without penalty or adversely affecting your relationship with Gilbert, Dr. Baldwin, or
Illinois State University.
If you would like to take the survey, please go to this link:
https://illinoisstate.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_dm4yBrfnmOahxuBIf you have any
questions, please contact Gilbert Kipkoech by email at gkipkoe@ilstu.edu.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Gilbert Kipkoech
Graduate Student/Graduate Teaching Assistant
School of Communication
Illinois State University
United States
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APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT
INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Dear Participant,
I am a graduate student under the direction of Dr. John Baldwin in the School of
Communication at Illinois State University. I am inviting you to participate in a research study to
understand how the media (re) produces political cultures (political attitudes and behaviors) as
part of my master’s Thesis. Findings in the form of statistics across surveys may be used for
poster presentations, conference papers, or possible publication.
I am inviting your participation, which will involve an online survey on your media use
and political attitudes and behaviors. The survey should take approximately 15-20 minutes.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate or to
withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty (it will not affect your relationship
with Gilbert Kipkoech, Dr. John Baldwin, or Illinois State University). You can refuse to answer
any question you do not wish to answer. Your responses are completely anonymous. To ensure
your anonymity, we will not reveal anything else that identifies any participant or track your IP
address.
We believe there are minimal risks associated with participating in this project beyond
those experienced in everyday life. You will receive no compensation for this study and there is
no anticipated benefit for you as a participant. Your participation will help extend our
understanding of the media influences on political attitudes and behaviors thus cultivating or
developing a political culture.
Your signature below indicates that you are voluntarily making a decision to participate
in this research study and have read and understood the information presented above. You may
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print a copy of this consent form to keep. Please note that you are NOT eligible to participate if
you are currently within the European Economic Area.
Please direct any questions and/or comments to Dr. John Baldwin (jrbaldw@ilstu.edu) or
to me (gkipkoe@ilstu.edu). For questions regarding your rights as a research participant you are
encouraged to contact the Illinois State University Research Ethics and Compliance Office:
Phone: 309-438-5527, Email: rec@ilstu.edu.

Respectfully,
Gilbert Kipkoech
Graduate Student
Illinois State University, School of Communication
gkipkoe@ilstu.edu

Do you agree to participate?
__ Yes, I am at least 18 and agree to participate
__ No, I do not wish to participate, or I am not 18
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
The following section asks about your media consumption, by this I mean the amount of time
you take to access/read/listen to/watch news.
1. Which news media is your most preferred source of political information?
a) TV
b) Radio
c) Newspaper
d) Internet
e) Interpersonal interaction
2. On a normal day, how much time do you spend watching the news on TV, listening to the
news on the radio, reading a newspaper and/or reading news online?
a) 1 = no time
b) 2 = less than 15 minutes
c) 3 = 15–30 minutes
d) 4 = 30mins–1 hour
e) 5 = 1–3 hours
f) 6 = 3–6 hours
g) 7 = 6–12 hours
h) 8 = more than 12 hours
3. How many days in a week do you watch the news on TV? (by this I mean, the 7 p.m. news
i.e. Citizen Tv’s Nipashe, NTV Jioni, KTN Leo, K24’s Mchipuko wa Habari or the 9 p.m.
prime-time news on Citizen TV, KTN News, NTV, 24 or KBC)
a) One
b) Two
c) Three
d) Four
e) Five
f) Six
g) Seven
4. How many days in a week do you read a daily newspaper?
a) One
g) Seven
b) Twice
c) Three
d) Four
e) Five
f) Six
5. How many days in a week do you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to
discuss current events, public issues or politics?
a) One
g) Seven
b) Twice
c) Three
d) Four
e) Five
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f) Six
6. How many days in a week do you read political news stories online?
g) One
g) Seven
h) Twice
i) Three
j) Four
k) Five
l) Six
7. During the past week, how much attention did you pay to news stories about politics?
a) A great deal
b) Some
c) Not too much
d) None
e) Don’t know

The following questions ask about your interest and participation in politics. Please indicate
the level that best describes your interest and participation in politics.
8. How interested would you say you are in politics?
a) Very interested
b) Somewhat interested
c) Not very interested
d) Not at all interested
e) Don't know
9. On political matters, people talk a lot about NASA (National Super Alliance) and Jubilee.
Generally, how would you place/identify your political affiliation?
a) NASA
b) Jubilee
c) Independent
d) Other (please specify _______________
e) Do not wish to disclose

10. The following are some different forms of political action that people can take. Please
indicate whether you have participated in any of these actions, whether you might do it, or
would never, under any circumstances, do it.
Have done Might do Never done
it
it
it
a) Signing a petition
a) Joining in boycotts
b) Attending lawful demonstrations

1
1
1

2
2
2
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3
3
3

Would never Don’t
it
know
4
4
4

5
5
5

c) Joining unofficial strikes
1
2
3
4
5
d) Voting
1
2
3
4
5
11. Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the
time, whether there is an upcoming election or not. Others are not that interested. Would you
say you follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of
the time, only now and then or hardly at all?
a) Most of the time
b) Some of the time
c) Now and then
d) Hardly
e) Don’t know
12. How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with your family, friends,
workmates or online?
a) One
b) Tow
c) Three
d) Four
e) More than four days
13. How often would you say you attend political rallies or political meetings in support of your
preferred candidate?
a) Always
b) Most of the time
c) Some of the time
d) Never
e) Don’t know
14. As of now, how likely are you to vote in future elections (e.g. by elections or 2022 general
elections)?
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Neutral
Not Very Likely
Not at all
15. How would you rate the responsibility of voting as a Kenyan?
a) Most important
b) Very important
c) Somewhat important
d) Not too important
The following section asks you about the trust (the level of confidence) that you have in the
following institutions. Please indicate the level of trust/confidence you have in the following
institutions.
16. Below are several organizations. For each one, please indicate how much confidence you
have in them: is it great confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or
none at all?
A Great Deal Quite A Lot Not Very Much None At All
Dk
The churches
1
2
3
4
9
The armed forces
1
2
3
4
9
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The press/media
Labor unions
The police
The government in Nairobi
Political parties
Parliament
The Civil service

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

9
9
9
9
9
9
9

17. Thinking about the national government, how much of the time do you think you can trust
the government to do the right thing?
a) Always
b) Most of the time
c) Some of the time
d) Never
e) Don’t know
18. How much confidence you have in the presidency (Executive Branch of the national
government)?
a) A great deal
b) A fair amount
c) Not too much
d) None at all
19. How much confidence you have in the parliament?
a) A great deal
b) A fair amount
c) Not too much
d) None at all
20. How much confidence do you have in the judiciary-including the Kenyan Supreme court?
a) A great deal
b) A fair amount
c) Not too much
d) None at all
21. How much confidence do you have in the elected officials in your county?
a) A great deal
b) A fair amount
c) Not too much
d) None at all
22. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?
a) Candidates usually tell voters what they want to hear
b) Candidates usually tell the voters what they truly believe is good for the country
c) Candidates tell the voters what they will really try to do
d) Candidates cannot be trusted to keep promises they make while campaigning
23. How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to report the news fairly?
a) Always
b) Most of the time
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c) Only some of the time
d) Almost never

Directions. The following question asks about your patriotism (the love you have for and pride
in your country). Please indicate from the following list that best describes your feeling.
24. How proud are you to be Kenyan?
a) Very proud
b) Quite proud
c) Not very proud
d) Not at all proud
e) I am not Kenyan
25. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?
a) I love my country.
b) I am proud to be from my country.
c) In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally
affected by its actions.
d) Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment
to my country always remains strong.
e) It is important to serve my country.
f) When I see my country do well in events like the Olympics, I feel great.

Directions: The following are statements people may make about television. For each statement
please indicate the degree to which you agree with each statement (Strongly Agree to Strongly
Disagree).
26. Television presents things as they really are in life.
27. If I see something on TV, I can’t be sure it really is that way.
28. Television lets me really see how other people live.
29. TV does not show life as it really is
30. Television lets me see what happens in other places as if I were really there.
Directions: Here are some statements people may make about television. For each statement,
please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement, from strongly agree
to strongly disagree.

31. The media presents negative personality characteristics about other tribes as they really are in
life.
32. The media lets me really see negative personality characteristics of other tribes
33. The media presents other tribes as untrustworthy, selfish, proud, or ignorant, which they
really are in real life
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34. The media presents positive personality characteristics about other tribes as they really are in
life
35. If I see other tribes on the media as untrustworthy, selfish, proud or ignorant, I can’t be sure
that they are really that way
36. If I see other tribes the negative personality characteristics about other tribes in the media, I
can’t be sure their personality is really that way
37. If I see members of other tribes with positive personality characteristics, I can’t be really sure
they are really that way
38. If I see something in the media, I can’t be sure it is really that way.
Demographic questions
39. What is your biological sex?
 Male
 Female
 Transgender
 Other
40. Please indicate your age on your last birthday _____________
41. What is your ethnic background?
 Native Kenyan
 Asian
 Multiracial
 I don’t want to disclose
 Other (please specify) ________________

42. Please indicate your highest level of achieved so far
 High school
 Diploma
 Bachelor’s or its equivalent (CPA, CPS, etc.)
 Master’s
 Ph.D.
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